

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN: 1988 TO 2008

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ABSTRACT

Since Pakistan's establishment, civilian governments and military command have worked closely together as a result of modest begging. To meet the needs of Pakistan's newly formed state government, the military had to be a well-organised institution. There will be no looking back in the barracks for the troops from that day forward. Pakistan has faced persistent security threats since its creation, resulting in large military involvement. The goal of a recent study is to look into the settings and environments in which this cooperation works, as well as the conditions under which it fails. To complete this research, primary and secondary data were employed in conjunction with historical and descriptive research.

Key words: civil-military relations, parliamentary, cooperate interest.

INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relations were one of the most talked-about topics in political circles around the world right after World War II. Scholars and writers tried to establish the theoretical framework under which these relations could be studied and analysed across the world. Scholars of politics list the reasons for civil-military interactions. Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer had discussed different parameters over which civil-military relations are established in the developing and developed worlds. Writers in the field are all agreed on the point that those armies that are more involved in civilian affairs are more likely to be involved in the politics of a particular country; Pakistan is a living example of this dimension of civil-military relations. There are a number of other reasons for military intervention in the politics of Pakistan, like the defence and security needs of the state at its external and internal borders. International and geographical factors also shape civil-military interaction in Pakistan. Pakistan is a unique combination of all these factors. The history of civil-military relations in Pakistan can be traced back to 1947, when the Pakistani civilian government had to rely on one of its most organised institutions, i.e., the military, to meet the security and survival challenges faced by the new state of Pakistan. The civil-military interaction continued in the upcoming years until 1958, when the military took over from the civilian government and started ruling the country directly.

Once the military tastes the direct rule, it's difficult for it to quit; hence, they maintained their direct or indirect rule in the upcoming years. Lust of power in military leadership and weak political institutions are responsible for the excessive military intervention in the politics of the state. There were years when civilian governments and military institutions worked with coordination (1947–57, 1971–77, 2008–13), and there were times when this coordination eroded due to multiple reasons (1988–1999).

Literature Review:

Rizvi (2000), in his book "Military, State, and Society in Pakistan," reveals how the military strengthens itself in Pakistan and how it is involved in the commercial and industrial sectors. Since 1958, the Pakistani military has either directly or indirectly taken part in state affairs. In addition to defence, the military also looked at foreign policy matters and domestic fronts in Pakistan. Rizvi explores reasons for military penetration in state affairs; the place of the chief of the army staff in the administrative troika (known as the National Security Council), along with the prime minister and president, also depicts the place of the army in the decision-making of the state. Schofield (2011), in her book "Inside the Pakistan Army," presents first-hand knowledge regarding the functioning of Pakistan's most disciplined

institutions. Regionalism and sectarianism are discouraged in the military; this practice establishes unity within military lines. Trainings and other decisions took place at the military headquarters, which is GHQ in Rawalpindi. In her book, she also discussed the Pakistan-US alliance against the war on terror and the role of the Pakistani military in executing this state policy. ISI and its contribution to the Afghan issue are also mentioned in one of her chapters in the book.

Saeed (1997), in his book "Civil Military Relations in Pakistan from Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto," discussed the Latin American model of civil military interaction according to the Donells model; this model works for industrial countries where civil military authoritarian attitudes leave unrest in the labour class, whereas Pakistan, since its independence, is an agrarian country. Saeed discovers in his book another aspect of military dominance over civil institutions, and that is due to the institutional strength of the military, which helps to overshadow the political and civilian organs of the state.

Haqqani (2005), in his book "Pakistan Between Mosque and Military," discussed different techniques of the Pakistani military to intrude in political affairs and effect the decisions of the elected politicians. How the military of Pakistan cashed the political differences of different political groups and used them in their favor. Haqqani, in his book, said that the military wants to deal with Afghan and Kashmir policy according to their agenda and is not ready to accept political authority over these issues.

Masood (2009), in an edited book "Pakistan the Struggle," discussed that the military agenda has been economic development, not political development. Military efficiency suffers due to its long-term engagement in the political affairs of the state, as it's not the military's job to perform civil institution functions only because they are not capable of performing their functions. He also mentioned that Musharraf draws his strength in politics through economic development and as the chief of army staff in military circles.

Khakwani (2003), in his article, presented different theories to study civil-military relations in Pakistan. According to Huntington, it's the bellicosity and authoritarianism of the military, whereas Janowitz believes that military oligarchy and civil-military relations are important reasons for military intervention in the political affairs of the state. Finer,

on the other hand, said that disposition and opportunity are the causes of the military's extended role in politics.

Alvi (2011), in his article "The Dominance of the Military Bureaucracy Oligarchy," discusses different categories in the military: one that starts serving in the military before partition, another that starts serving during the time of partition, and the last one that represents the recent recruitment after partition. He discussed the extensive military role due to the weak political and economic institutions of Pakistan. Hassan (2011), in his article titled "Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse," lists a number of causes, including weak political intuition, the judiciary, and politicians. The role of the Muslim League was also discussed, as it was unable to establish itself as a political party with a developmental agenda for Pakistan.

Waseem (2009), in his work "Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan," in an edited book, discussed how the Pakistani military started dominating the political scene during the 1950s, except in the Bhutto era. The Bhutto era was an exception as the military tried to rebuild its image, which was damaged due to the Dhaka debacle. The charismatic personality of Bhutto also played an important role in bringing the military under civilian rule. He also shed light on how the military strengthens the hands of Islamists and other pressure groups just to maintain pressure on the civilian government to act as desired by the military high command.

Objectives of Study:

- The objective of this study is to develop an understanding of civil-military relations within a theoretical framework.
- To investigate the historical perspective of civil-military relations.
- To predict the future of civil-military relations in light of the ongoing scenario.


Research Questions:

- What are the causes of military intervention in the politics of Pakistan?
- Under what circumstances would the military be more likely to intervene than others?
- What are the constitutional roles of civil-military institutions?

Civil-Military Relations Theoretical Framework:
 To understand the Kargil conflict in the civil-military context, it's very important to first draw the theoretical parameters under which this study will proceed further. There are different scholars who wrote about the concept, but the present research will focus on the theories given by Huntington, Janowitz, and Finer. Khakwani (2003), in his article, discusses

the views of three writers regarding civilian-military relations around the world. Huntington discussed that the military used to observe a realistic, conservative, and professional approach in their professional work. According to Huntington, there are two features that led the army to dominate civilian authorities.


Figure 1.1 **Features of Army According to Huntington**



Source: Khakwani (2003)

Janowitz also explains the five types of civil-military relations. Authoritarian personal control

Figure 1.2: Janowitz Two Categories of Militarism



(Decided role of Military to pursue their policies)


1. Authoritarian mass party
2. Democratic competitive or semi-competitive system
3. Civil-military coalitions
4. Military oligarchy

Source: Khakwani (2003)

Finer, another scholar on civil-military relations, provides us with reasons as to why the military intervenes in politics. Khawkani (2003) quotes two

reasons given by Finer while discussing the role of the military of the military in politics: Disposition and opportunity.

Figure 1.3 Disposition and Opportunity



Source: Khakwani (2003)

The question of civil-military interaction came into the limelight with the advent of modern states and professional militaries; this can be understood by studying different models of civil-military interaction. The first model is the UK-US-European model; in this model, civil and military institutions are developed and professional. These institutions interact positively whenever needed, but the dominance of civilian authorities is beyond any

doubt. The second model is an ideological and totalitarian model in which ideology is enforced by the ruling party, sometimes with the support of the military. The third model is of revolutionary armies that were involved in the freedom movement or in civil wars (Askari, 2008).

There were two organised and better equipped departments in Pakistan at the time of independence, namely the bureaucracy and the military. Pakistan's

military can be classified into three generations. The pre-independent generation trained in 1947 under British military schools, represented by Ayub Khan. The post-independent generation of 1953–1963 trained under Pak-US military defence agreements (SEATO, CENTO) like Yaha Khan. Third generation after 1965, which has been the Pakistani version represented by Zia-ul-Haq.

Before the division of the subcontinent, military recruitment was done by notable families, and after partition, it was the feudal class and other well-to-do classes of society, but these trends changed, and now the middle class is more interested in and recruited for military services (Alvi, 2011). What type of Pakistani military organisation is it? It can be well defined in the military's motto *Men at their best*. The military draws its power not from weapons but from its hierarchical structure. The unity in military lines is carved out by excluding regionalism and sectarianism from military lines (Schofield, 2011).

Historical Background:

Pakistan came into being on August 14, 1947, under unusual circumstances, facing threats from Eastern and Western borders. The beginning of civil-military relations can be traced back to the era of Ayub Khan. The first COAS to topple down the civilian government on the grounds that a civilian leader was unable to deliver. The political and economic condition of the state, according to the historian, were also at stake. Under these circumstances, Ayub Khan took the charge, as it's one of the military's constitutional responsibilities to look after the state's interests if they're in danger. Politicians and civilian intelligentsia appreciate this act of Ayub Khan, which enables him to justify his position; afterwards, the military never went out of the politics of Pakistan, directly or indirectly, to make their presence in politics. This situation is given in a table.

Table 1.1: Civil Military Patterns Since 1947 to 2009

Type	Duration	Period
Direct Military Rule	17 years	1958-62,1969-71,1977-85,1999-2002
Military President Heading the Elected Government.	16 years	1962-69,1985-88,2002-08
Elected government under Civilian President Troika	12 years	1988-99,2008-09
Supremacy of non-Parliamentary forces under Parliamentary rule	11 years	1947-58
Civilian Supremacy	6 years	1971-77

Waseem (2009)

Since 1947, there have been three direct military rules: Ayub Khan, Zia-al-Haq, and Musharraf. The first military ruler was Ayub Khan (1958–1969), who was elected by the Electoral College as the president of Pakistan. The second president was Zia-al-Haq (1977–88), who became president through a referendum, and lastly, Musharraf (1999–2018), who conducted a referendum in 2002 and became president of Pakistan. Although these military men took on the on the electoral umbrella, the process of elections was always questionable. For twelve years, civil-military interaction was under a system called administrative troika, where the prime minister, president, and chief of the army staff were the key decision-makers in state affairs. The first ever general elections were held in 1970–71, in which Bhutto became the first elected leader by the people. Afterward, Bhutto had to rely on the military to carry out their Balochistan policy, which led the military to exploit Bhutto (Waseem, 2009).

Governor General Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the first constitutional assembly in 1954, which was challenged in the Sindh High Court in the case of Malvi Tamezuddin, which gave a verdict against the action, but the Supreme Court ratified the action on national security grounds. In a very short period, four prime ministers were replaced by Iskinder Mirza, who was the Governor General and first President of Pakistan. He also dissolved the second national assembly in 1958. Iskandar Mirrza invited Ayub Khan to take the reins of government as the general elections of 1959 were around the corner and he was afraid to lose his seat as president. This political musical chair finally ends in 1958 when C in C Ayub Khan takes over under the condition of sheer political unrest.

First Martial Law:

Ayub Khan took charge as the first chief executive. He first introduced the BD system, then conducted a referendum in 1960 in which he was selected as president, then made a constitutional committee, and finally, a new constitution was given to the nation on June 8, 1962, which gave him absolute power. From 1962 on, he served as the president of Pakistan. Ayub conducted non-party base elections, and he also introduced the local body system, which was previously practiced in the subcontinent, to cater to the political parties. He also introduced two acts named EBDO (elected bodies disqualification orders) and PODO (public office disqualification orders) both in 1959 to disqualify political leaders and civil servants. Internationally, it was the time when Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO for their security needs. In 1965, Pakistan fought a war against India, but that war had no direct benefits for Pakistan. This unsuccessful attempt deteriorated the military image in the eyes of the Pakistani nation (Rizvi, 2000).

Second Martial Law:

Pakistan's second martial law was enforced by Yahya Khan in 1969, as there was a large demonstration held against Ayub Khan on the same grounds on which he overthrew the civilian government (bad governance). The only credit to Yahya Khan was that he conducted the first ever free and fair general election in East and West Pakistan in 1970. He was successful in conducting the election but was not able to tackle the onward political situation regarding power sharing between the East and West majority-winning political parties. Yahya enjoyed a short period as president as strong sentiments were raised against the military by the masses due to the fall of Dhaka in 1971.

The First Elected Civilian Government of Pakistan:

Bhutto took charge as president and chief martial law administrator in 1971, but he changed his designation to prime minister as he managed to overcome the constitutional issues of the state and gave the third constitution on August 14, 1973. The 1970 general election was the first general election conducted since 1947. Bhutto was the popular leader who got the majority in West Pakistan. He was experienced as the ex-foreign minister in the Ayub cabinet. He was a seasoned person who knew that if he wanted to

work free from military pressure, he must tighten his grip over the military. For this military. For this purpose, he dismissed a number of military personnel from their posts, but the issue of Balochistan once again took civilian leaders to the door of the military. The second general election of Pakistan was conducted in 1977, but the results were not accepted by the political parties. Here, once again, the military had a couple of reasons to overthrow Mr. Bhutto. He lost his legitimacy, and the military was unhappy due to the cancellation of the arms deal with the US because of the unstable political situation in Pakistan (Rizvi, 2000).

Third Martial Law:

The third martial law of Pakistan was imposed in 1977 by Zia-ul-Haq, the COAS, who decided to take over as the political situation of the state was worsening with every passing day. Zia delayed the election until 1984, and before that, he held a referendum, in which he was elected president. Zia regime outstands due to their Islamization policies; he did not end the constitution as he simply couldn't due to the constitutional restriction, so he introduced amendments in it that changed the basic nature of the constitution from parliamentary to presidential; Article 58(2)(b) enables the president to dissolve the national assembly if it loses the support of the majority without consulting the prime minister. Zia-ul-Haq continues as president with US support, as the 1979 Afghan War attracts US attention in this region, and no one else except military men can better watch US interest in this area. The Zia era was relatively relaxing on the domestic front, as Pakistan was engaged on its western borders. The civil-military relations were at ease as the Islamist party was supporting Zia in Afghan jihad. The PPP, after the death of Bhutto, was inactive with no major opposition in Zia ways of government (Rizvi 2000).

Benazir First Tenure:

The Zia regime came to an unexpected end due to the planned crash of Zia ul Haq in 1988. This time, the military avoided taking charge of the government as it appoints a civilian as President Ghulam Ishaq Khan but worked in close contact with him to hold general elections in Pakistan. The military decided to maintain distance from politics, not to cut off from politics. Top leaders, in collaboration with ISI (interservice intelligence), strengthened the hands of nine political party alliances called IJI (Islami

Jamhoori Ittehad), out of which six were Islamist parties. Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, returned and decided to participate in the 1988 elections. ISI wanted to divide the vote of the PPP, and they were successful in their efforts, as PML leader Nawaz Sharif, a member of the IJI alliance, won a majority in Punjab, the populous province of Pakistan, and the PPP won majority seats in the National Assembly but not enough to form a government. Ms. Bhutto became the first female Prime Minister in the 1988 general elections. The military had reservations about seeing Ms. Bhutto as prime minister, despite her declaring that she wanted to work in collaboration with military leaders and would not affect their cooperation interests. This was not enough, as the military high command was highly suspicious of her links with Rajiv Ghandi, and the military was not sure of Ms. Bhutto's intentions over the nuclear program. Her withdrawal policy from Afghanistan without a guarantee of a pro-Pakistan government in Afghanistan was another concern of the military on the following grounds: military leaders did not allow her to visit nuclear sites in Pakistan (Haqqani, 2005). Ishaq Khan, with the support of the support of the military, dissolved the first government . of Ms. Bhutto in 1990 under Article 58 (2) b over charges of corruption, political instability, economics, and law and order issues.

Nawaz Sharif, First Tenure:

This time again, the military led civilians to rule, an interim government was installed, and the next elections were held in Pakistan in 1990. The election results were in favour of Nawaz Sharif political party PML(N), but he still had to form a coalition government with other political parties like MQM from Sindh. Nawaz Sharif carefully started his relationship with the army, not touching their cooperation interests. Soon, differences grew over the Gulf War as US anti-Iraq policy was not liked by the military, whereas the civilian government supported them by sending troops to protect Saudi Arabia. General Beg openly criticises this act of government; he also raises questions about the Indian threat, but these were not taken seriously by Sharif. Beg was succeeded by Janjua, who also did not like Sharif's decision regarding the appointment of the ISI head and the transfer of Hameed Gul. Operation in Sindh was another point of difference between the military and Sharif government, as it annoyed his parliamentary alliance with MQM. These issues and

others like governance, economic conditions, and law and order once again allowed Ishaq Khan to move on military instruction and dismiss Sharif's government. This time Sharif went to court and the Supreme Court restored his government, but later he found difficulty in governance. Then military leader Kaker came up with a solution; he separately met the president and Sharif. After this, Sharif and Ishaq Kahn resigned; new elections were held in 1993 (Rizvi, 2000).

Second Term of Benazir Bhutto:

In the 1993 general election, Benazir won majority seats in the National Assembly. This time, Ms. Bhutto played her cards carefully; she had smooth and working relations with the army and did not intervene in their internal matters nor cut down their loin share, which in turn let her continue. This time, worse law and order in Sindh, an economic issue, and charges against her husband provide grounds for President Lagari to dismiss her government in 1997 with the consent of COAS Jahangir Karamat (Rizavi, 2000).

Second Term of Nawaz Sharif:

Sharif Clean sweeps the election polls in the general elections of 1997. Sharif was good with military leaders and presidents. The issue started with the appointment of judges in court and the conflict between the PM and president. A mob of PML (N) protesters attacked the Supreme Court Chief Justice and asked the president and COAS for security. Differences did not end here, as the Kargil Crisis was another episode of civil-military conflict. This conflict occurred just after the Lahore declaration in February 1999 between India PM Vajpayee and Sharif. The military was not satisfied with this political development between these two countries. Sharif appointed Musharraf out of turn COAS as he was not from strong military background. Kargil Crisis and the effort to put blame on the issue by both sides weaken the position of both in the eyes of the masses. Sharif removes Musharraf from the post of COAS and tries to appoint another COAS when Musharraf is on his official trip. Reportedly, he was coming back when his plan was not allowed to land at the airport. At the airport. At the time, Musharraf, with his limited trust and worthy friends, toppled down the civilian government . of Sharif and became Chief Executive in 1999. Musharraf, like his other military fellows, conducted local body elections in

2002 and presidential referendums in the same year. In the 2004 general election, with the support of his king's party, he was elected president and COAS because he did not want to leave his army job like Zia until 2006 (Cloughley, 2000).

Reasons for Military Intervention in Pakistani Politics:

Why does the does the military of Pakistan so frequently intervene in politics? This is a question that always strikes the minds of civil and military relations students. Pakistan and India got their independence from the same colony. India never experienced military rule, whereas Pakistan was under direct military rule for almost 16 years. The reasons for these interventions are

- **Military Organisation:**

The Pakistani military is considered one of the most organised institutions in Pakistan, in the words of Schofield (2011). The military draws its power not from weapons but from its organization. The organisation of the military is the combination of features like discipline, professionalism, and hierarchy that enable the military to supersede other institutions of the state. Since independence, the military continued its style and never liked anyone to interrupt. In the first term of Sharif, he grew into differences with President Ishaq Khan over the appointment of COAS. He tried to use sections of the army against the president; this act of Sharif backfired as the military took the impression that Sharif tried to divide the army between two camps. In 1999, he tried to appoint a new COAS from the staff section by replacing Musharraf, who was also not liked by military authorities in his second term because, traditionally, COAS always came from line authority.

Figure 1.4: . Key Features of Military Organisation

Professional And Cooperative Interests:

Since independence, the military has been able to get a large share of the national budget. The main reason was the very first encounter of Pakistan with India in 1948. From then on, the military had solid ground to realise the potential threat to Pakistan's security from its eastern borders. The very first budget of Pakistan reflects the importance of defence needs, which was realised by the politicians as a large part goes to the defence budget. Ayub Khan, in his tenure, started a number of other benefits for the armed forces, among

which land allotment was the most popular. From then on, the forces were never ready to bear a cut in their budget. In the first term of Benazir, she assured the military that she would not cut military expenditures despite the IMF pressures. Whenever a military ruler steps down, they make sure that their cooperation and professional interests continue. This can only be watched if the economic condition of the state is under control, so the military agenda once they are in politics is to ensure economic development, and they are least bothered by political development.

Role in Foreign Policy Making:

As Pakistan got independence under the threat of India and we always doubted Indian intentions, this threat let the army take hold of Pakistan's foreign policy over India right from the early days. In Ms. Bhutto's first term, when she tried to establish fresh terms of Pak-Indo relations using her personal link with the Ragive Ghandi military, they were suspicious of her intentions. India is not the only country; Afghanistan is another example since 1979, during which the military maintained that any policy regarding it must be asked for by the military. Ms. Bhutto's policy over Kashmir and her view over the Afghan issue were also not accepted by the military, as they believed that Benazir would further the US agenda and tried to withdraw from Afghanistan without much benefit to Pakistan. The military wanted to see the Pakistani government in Afghanistan, but they were not sure that Ms. Bhutto was also thinking along the same lines. The same is true of Sharif. When he tried to establish relations with India, a fresh military leadership raised their eyebrows over Sharif's intentions in his first term. In his second term, the military once again became uneasy with the Lahore declaration between Sharif and Vajpayee. The Kashmir issue also cannot be tackled alone by a political leader's military; it must be asked before any decision. These are the three issues that alone cannot be tackled by politicians or governments without consulting military high command.

Political Reasons for Military Intervention:

As already discussed in the military aspect of intervention, there is a need to mention the political factors that facilitate military intervention.

- **Lack of a national political party:**

The very issue of Pakistani politics is, that since 1947 Pakistan lacked national political party which can address the national problems. The Muslim League was the party that was considered the creator of Pakistan, but even the Muslim League did not transform its outlook as a national political party. Quaid and then Liaquat Ali Khan passed away, and there was no other person in the party who could guide the nation in times of need. The Muslim League divides into sections, with every government struggling for power (Shafiqat, 1997).

- **Parliamentary System:**

Pakistan opted for a federal and parliamentary system as that of their colonial power, but the problem was that politicians were not trained in the line of parliamentary culture, which is tolerance and cooperation. The issues of constitutional making lingered until 1956 due to the uncompromising nature of the politicians. Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza, the former Governor General and president of Pakistan, damaged the parliamentary system by dismissing the prime ministers one after the other. Since 1951–57, Pakistan has had two governors general and seven prime ministers (Hassan, 2011).

- **Role of Bureaucracy:**

As discussed, earlier Pakistan strong institutions have been military and bureaucracy. Bureaucracy has also been involved in politics since 1947. Iskandar Mirza and Ishaq Khan both had a bureaucratic background, and Mirza also served in the military in his initial years of employment. Mirza's close connection with the army and bureaucracy helps them exploit politicians and prolong his stay as president. Mirza not only dismissed a number of prime ministers, which created unrest, but also invited the military to take over the government in 1958.

- **Weak State Institutions:**


Not only were the politicians of Pakistan inexperienced, but the other institutions were also not fully aware of their responsibilities. The very first military coup of 1958 was approved by the Supreme Court on the grounds of the doctrine of *necessity*, but in the coming years, the second coup of 1977 and then 1999 was also approved by the Supreme Court. Courts and the military always took shelter under the

constitutional cover of Article 245, which says that armed forces are responsible for the defence of the state within civilian government . direction. It was always said that the military took over for the defence of the state, as all takeovers took place under circumstances when the law and order situation was worse and civilian governments were unable to control the situation (Hassan, 2011).

- **Role of the Military in Decision-Making:**

Low repute of politicians allows military to make their presence in national decision making on permanent basis. The military desire was practically executed in the Zia era in the form of the National Security Council. This council consists of the Prime Minister, President, Chief of Army Staff, and other professionals, as the military believes that politicians are not worthy of taking technical decisions. After the Zia regime, NSC transformed into an administrative troika, with the PM, COAS, and President.

Figure 1.5: Administrative Troika



(Waseem, 2009).

Musharraf once again did not want to rely on politicians and constitute the NSC after his takeover. The concept of NSC was borrowed from Turkey, where the military has a constitutional role in national decision-making in the form of NSC, following the following the same lines as Pakistani military leadership (Waseem, 2009).

Findings

Once into politics, how to step out of it is a question that always confronts military leaders. Practically, they tried to prolong their rule, as did Ayub, Zia, and Musharraf. So to speak, all of them promised that they would soon return to barracks as long as political and economic conditions were under

control, but in real terms, it's hard for them to return. It's clear that they can't prolong their stay in politics, so what they do either

- They resign from the military post and keep possessing civilian posts in civil dress or
- Select loyal civilian leaders who can further their agenda while they are on their backs or
- Get out of politics, but keep an eye on political activities or
- Go with some constitutional arrangements like NSC or
- If their reputation is at stake, like in the Ayub era, the Tashkand declaration proved fatal for Ayub and earned bad feelings for the military from people. Yahya Khan had to leave because of the 1971 debacle. The military wants to keep its good image as the guardian of the state, so they cannot afford such incidents on their credit.
- Prolonged engagements in politics damaged their professional reputations as they missed their training exercises and workshops.

Recommendations:

- Military professionalism was compromised due to long engagement in politics, which compromised the quality of its work.
- All state institutions should work within their constitutional boundaries. Discipline, hierarchy, and professionalism are the keys to strong institutions; these attributes must be in place in all state institutions.
- The extensive involvement of the military in all sections of society is a problem that can be reduced by strengthening all state institutions so they can deliver without asking for help from the military every now and then.

Conclusion

They are sure that their cooperation and professional interests will be continued by the civilian leaders; if nothing is working, they will continue to work in the political realm. The key is that military interests should not be damaged or put at risk (Rizvi, 2000). Pakistan gets two well-developed political institutions from its British legacy: one is bureaucracy and the other is the military. From the very first day, the Pakistani army had to be involved in civilian affairs as it had to look after the immigrants so that they could safely reach Pakistan.

The other responsibility of the military was to look after civilian matters, as Pakistan initially lacked infrastructure. The War of 1948 with India also highlights the role of the army in Pakistan, yet the military was performing there under civilian rule. The death of Quaid Azam in 1948 left a gap in the leadership of Pakistan, and very shortly, the murder of Khan Liaquat Ali Khan widened this gap in leadership further. Under this situation, politicians in Pakistan were unable to deliver, and there was a constant tug of war for power between East and West Pakistani politicians, and Governor General and Prime Ministers were not exception.

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