

## PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA: ESTRANGED CLIENT VERSUS PATRONS COMPETITION

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### ABSTRACT

Patron-Client approach as via medium can be helpful in bridging the gap between the distinct perspectives of political economy and strategic realism that dominates the contemporary literature on Pakistan's relations with major powers such as the US and China. It not only bridges the gap between strategic realism but also political economy debates while connecting the internal dynamics of Pakistan with its foreign policy behavior. Pakistan as client of the US and China has been defined as an estranged client which behaves autonomously of patrons which is connected to its role termed as strategic and policing client over different stages of its foreign policy history. Pakistan has remained as a strategic client simultaneously of China and the US during and after the cold war while a policing client after 9/11. Its role was concerned with major powers' interests outside the territory whereas after 9/11 its role concerns the major powers' interests inside the territory of Pakistan. In both case Pakistan behaves autonomously of patrons when the patronal interests clash with the interests of Pakistan defined in this paper as military capabilities, economic interests and its state formation. In this paper patron-client model is revised by incorporating elements of methodological pluralism, dynamism and simultaneity. The study is based on post-positivist ontological positionality with positivist case study, content and thematic analysis.

**Keywords:** - Patron, Estranged Client, Patronal Competition, State Formation, Policing Client, Strategic Client

### INTRODUCTION

China and the United States have had close relations with Pakistan. The latter has seen cyclical highs and lows based on the degree of disagreement on specific subjects, such as Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons and the issue of the Haqqani network in the US war on terror. The Indo-China War of 1962, which is credited with bringing both countries closer to strategic and economic collaboration, is thought to have been the catalyst for Pakistan's relations with China. The US financial assistance to Pakistan as was said to pale in comparison to the much-exaggerated

China's commitment to invest over 46 billion dollars on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).<sup>1</sup> Concerns like Pakistan's treatment of the Taliban and Afghanistan are so serious that US lawmakers were drafting legislation in 2016 to punish Pakistan economically and designate it as a "terrorism sponsoring state".<sup>2</sup> Pakistan's proximity to China and its significance for the US make it important to research if US pressure is the reason Pakistan changed its foreign policy, or whether China assisted Pakistan in absorbing such pressure. China's

<sup>1</sup> Anwar Iqbal, "Chinese investments dwarf American package: US media", Dawn, April 21, 2015. URL: [http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools\\_citationguide.html](http://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools_citationguide.html) (November 2, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> "US lawmakers move bill to declare Pakistan 'state sponsor of terrorism'", Dawn, September 21, 2016. URL: <http://www.dawn.com/news/1285165> (November, 05, 2016).

relationship with Pakistan has not altered, despite the US's history of intermittently becoming closer to and being more estranged from Pakistan.

Since Pakistan has maintained close ties with both the US and China both during and after the Cold War, with periodic highs and lows, much of the scholarship has focused on how a smaller state maintains relations with two rival or competing major powers simultaneously and how Pakistan has behaved independently of its patrons. During the Cold War, the logic of ideological rivalry between the US and the former Soviet Union led many people to believe that joining one major power would inevitably result in the enmity of another. However, in the post-cold war era, especially after 9/11, the dynamics of interstate rivalry changed with the emergence of new major powers and new patterns of competition. Because of this, the traditional patron-client model is static and lacks methodological simultaneity and pluralism. To address these problems, the patron-client model must be revised to reflect the evolving patterns of interstate relations, particularly the interactions between smaller states and major powers.

In an effort to fill in the gaps in the literature, I will use Pakistan as a client of both China and the US in this paper. Pakistan's relations with these two major countries are unusual since it has maintained ties with them while demonstrating both compliance and non-compliance through relatively independent behavior. Since the case study of Pakistan, a smaller state with relations to major powers like the US and China, is the main focus of this study, the patron-client model offers a comprehensive framework for analyzing how smaller states interact with major powers because it not only connects external and internal factors, but also has methodological pluralism in terms of extending its scope.

Pakistan has demonstrated autonomous policy behavior in the past on a number of issues, including the formation of Sino-Pakistan alliances following the Indo-China border conflict, the development of nuclear weapons and conducting nuclear tests against the US wishes and the relationship between Pakistan and the Afgha-Taliban after 9/11. This study's

objectives are to rethink the Patron-Model while

acknowledging its benefits examines Pakistan's interactions with China and the US, and comprehend the dynamics of domestic variables that influence the foreign policies of smaller states. In order to make analysis regarding the relationships between smaller nations and major powers more applicable and relevant, the study addresses various theoretical standpoints that deal with the patron-client model. This article addresses issues such as why Pakistan acts independently of its patrons and how Pakistan balances the interests of the major powers with the requirements of its state structure.

### DEFINING THE PATRON-CLIENT MODEL

According to historical data, Pakistan's goals were primarily focused on enhancing its capacity to fight India, but US relations with Pakistan were shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War. This puts into question the standard approaches to smaller states' interactions with large powers because these theories generalize about the behavior of states without accounting for the unique characteristics of a state that influence how policies are formed.

Actor general theories, as Hudson calls them, overlook state particularities. The statement suggests that human decision makers acting alone or as a team is the cornerstone of all that happens on the international stage. It provides the idea that any unit of decision-making that is involved in formulating state policy is comparable to a single, rational actor, equating it to a state. This method of interacting with states is most commonly referred to as "blackboxing" the state or as a "billiard ball model."<sup>3</sup> These theories are known as actor general theories, in contrast to actor specific theories, which made an effort to explain how domestic variables influenced the formulation of foreign policy. Actor-specific techniques encompass a variety of research areas within the subject of foreign policy analysis, such as the psychological approaches to foreign policy development, the comparative foreign policy approach, and the foreign policy decision making approach. Actor-specific techniques have a methodological flaw in that they ignore foreign impacts on state behavior and only concentrate on domestic factors. Furthermore, given that these approaches arose in response to actor general

<sup>3</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis* (2005):1-2.

theories, research in these disciplines has a tendency to provide generalizations about the behavior of the state, which seem in contradiction. It is noteworthy that attempts were undertaken the proponents of political economy perspectives to close on the gap between internal and external causes; nevertheless, these efforts also raised issues about the classification of states as developed or underdeveloped.<sup>4</sup> It narrows research to just the economic considerations that influence how foreign policy is made, ignoring other aspects that must be considered, such as the strategic and sociopolitical components. According to Christopher P. Carney, the patron-client model seems to have a broader reach than the other two models.<sup>5</sup>

The interstate patron-client model has its roots in the works of Christopher P. Carney, Shoemaker, and Spanier. Carney has provided a thorough explanation and broad overview of the Patron client concept. According to him, it involves a dyadic connection between two asymmetric powers, where the client is a weaker state and the patron is a more powerful one. He goes on to say that states choose to enter and exit this type of partnership voluntarily.<sup>6</sup> Pressures from the within and outside were present when Pakistan joined the US alliance system and later established diplomatic ties with China. Entry and exit from the relationship lack a voluntary component because the US was subject to strategic compulsions as well. It has more to do with the objectives of policy that a state establishes or encounters. Carney emphasises the theory of dependency and a comparative foreign policy approach in his defence of the patron-client model. He contends that while a comparative foreign policy approach concentrates on cross-national differences, dependency takes developmental agendas into account. He suggests that compared to the other two techniques, the patron client approach seems to have a broader scope. Dependency theory, according to Carney, addresses underdevelopment. It differs from patron-client relationships in that the former are imposed on third-world countries, while the latter are formed voluntarily.<sup>7</sup> Dependency stems from unequal power exchanges between patrons and

clients in patron-client relationships. Gerdezi and Feroz Ahmed established a connection between Pakistan and American assistance in both the 1950s and the 1960s. It makes sense in that perspective to say that Pakistan's patron-client relationships led to dependency. The dependence seems to be more focused on integrating and maximizing profits.<sup>8</sup>

According to Shoemaker and Spanier, the goal of patron-client relations is to improve the security of each patron and client, for whom security-based transactions are increasingly common and widespread. The client asks for security guarantees, provision of weapons, technological help, and patronage.<sup>9</sup> While Pakistan was focused on building a robust state structure and military capability to counter potential challenges from India, it is well known that US policy in the Middle East forced the US to become closer to Pakistan.

Nonetheless, the foreign policies of the smaller states are reduced to major power politics exclusively when all third-world countries are treated equally and according to the same goal structure. Since various states actually have distinct objectives and governmental structures, no one element influences their policies. Conversely, Shoemaker contends that since the internal goal structure has less bearing on the external goal structure, the two are addressed independently. Declaring impact as an indicator of a connection would be improper. So, the argument that smaller states receive assistance for economic, security, and geopolitical reasons while also limiting their influence on global politics makes it seem even more contradictory. Smaller states are interconnected as well, and the support they receive affects both their internal state structures and security. This element may be more relevant in determining the level of compliance and non-compliance from the client which is not associated merely with threat level and strategic goals of the patron.

For that purpose, the nature and structure of the state of Pakistan needs to be defined so that its particularities may be connected with its foreign policy behavior i.e., separation of domestic state structure from international politics may be avoided.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Christopher P. Carney, "International Patron-Client Relationships: A Conceptual Framework" *Studies in Comparative International Development (SCID)* 24, No. 2 (1989): 42-55.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> Christopher P. Carney, "International Patron-Client Relationships, 44.

<sup>9</sup> Shoemaker and Spanier, *Patron Client Relationships*, 14.

Regarding their state structures, all of the smaller states are treated equally in the Carney and Shoemaker models. They actually differ from one other, just as the main powers do. Such a redefinition can make use of the particularity feature. Because it concentrates too much on the domestic state structure, this type of inquiry is thought to have methodological issues. But only the dependency theory and the comparative foreign policy approach are relevant to this argument but as mentioned earlier both have lesser explanatory power compared to interstate patron-client model.<sup>10</sup>

### STATE FORMATION AND PATRON CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

According to Hamza Alavi, the post-colonial state of Pakistan is overdeveloped in relation to its society, and this is reflected in the superstructure of the domestic state. He views the military bureaucratic oligarchy as the overdeveloped state structure in the new state.<sup>11</sup> According to Asim Sajjad Akhtar, overdeveloping nature serves the state apparatus's hegemonic goals of accumulating capital and power through the employment of various social and political forces. He makes reference to Gramsci, who links the state's hegemonic process to the creation and growth of dominant classes. Therefore, through a social process that is designed, many political processes are guided and artificially manufactured.<sup>12</sup> Without taking into account the strategic goals of these ideological forces, Asim's argument has limited explanatory power. As he rightly notes, dependence is primarily concerned with the accumulation of capital, while Pakistan's state system is built on the accumulation of both capital and power. He disregards the strategic component of that method of operation at the same time. Only twenty families benefited from US economic support and the ensuing economic policies, according to Zaidi, during Ayub Khan's regime.<sup>13</sup>

He contends that institutions representing various classes have supplanted the state's class structure in Pakistan, and these institutions now compete with one another for dominance. Asim analyses US assistance for Pakistan through the lens of imperialism's territorial logic, which is linked to this evolution and struggle. The US has had a significant influence on the composition of the state and society since 1979.<sup>14</sup> Zaidi's line of reasoning extends to cover the state's hegemonic apparatus and military prowess, which undoubtedly involves the rise of religious groups. Zaidi contends that the shifts in Pakistani society are closely related to Pakistan's involvement in the war in Afghanistan.<sup>15</sup> From that perspective, Pakistan's function as a US client is analyzed. In a similar vein, Tariq Amin Khan applies the post-colonial model to Pakistan's development trajectory, which was chosen with US approval. He claims that there is a military-dominated relationship between the US and Pakistan's ruling elite that does not serve the interests of the general populace. He notes that Pakistan received financial support and armaments, which the military utilized against individuals engaged in resistance politics. Religious disputes and ethnic nationalist movements were among them.<sup>16</sup> In addition, he contends that the US and post-colonial client states supported political Islam's rise as a counterbalance against left-wing political movements. Afterwards, there was a push for radical Islam to combat the Soviet Union. The pursuit of these imperial goals kept Pakistan's post-colonial client state construction in a strong security state. Nonetheless, following the Cold War, religious political parties in Pakistan and the Deobandi and Wahabi brands of Islamist organisations served as a counterbalance to secular political parties in Pakistan and as a strategy to counter the Soviet Union. Hegemonic apparatus in this study is defined as the religious and militant forces patronized by the state for domestic political legitimacy and as a strategic tool in its foreign policy actions. In the same manner

<sup>10</sup> Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations", *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, (2005):1–30.

<sup>11</sup> Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh," *New Left Review* 74, (1972): 59–81.

<sup>12</sup> Asim Sajjad Akhtar, *The Politics of Common Sense: State, Society and Culture in Pakistan* (Cambridge university Press; 2018).

<sup>13</sup> S. Albar Zaidi, *Issues in Pakistan's Economy* (OUP Catalogue, 2005).

<sup>14</sup> S. Akbar Zaidi, "Rethinking Pakistan's Political Economy: Class, State, Power, and Transition", *Economic and Political Weekly*, No.5 (February, 2014): 51-53.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Tariq Amin Khan, *The Genealogy of Post-Colonial State in India and Pakistan* (Vanguard Books, 2012)

militant Islam or the Islamic militant groups justified the expansion of a universalized security state structure. It has resulted into circumvention of democratic forces in the world. The US is regarded as security state whereas Pakistani state has also become more securitized.<sup>17</sup>

Farzana Sheikh draws a connection between Pakistan's attempts to repress regional, ethnic, and linguistic demands through the use of religion and Islamic ideology, particularly during the Zia Era, and the overdeveloped state. By pacing all political opposition and linguistic variation as the other primarily associates them with India and the self with two nations theory, Sadia Toor uses the efforts of the states to define national culture to differentiate between the other and the self. This sows the seed of exclusionary discourses and justifies centralized authority.

Ayesha Jalal argues that the distinction between the external and internal challenges remained blurred. It was convenient to view internal opposition to have been stirred up by the enemies. Pakistan, according to Danish and Soherwordi, acts apart from its patrons. The development of nuclear weapons and the lack of action against the Afghan Taliban are cited as empirical evidence in favor of this viewpoint. Danish refers to Pakistan as an estranged client, while Soherwordi describes Pakistan's relationship with the US as estranged. According to Danish, a client is considered estranged if it solely fulfills its obligations to the patrons in order to further their geostrategic, socioeconomic, and political goals. Soherwordi contends that as the US's relative power has decreased, Pakistan now acts independently.<sup>18</sup> It is noteworthy that he does not equate the idea of relative power with that of significance. It implies that Pakistan's prominence in the US's strategic calculations declines proportionately as its power declines. This is insufficient justification for Pak-US collaboration in the US war on terror.

Danish makes reference to Alavi, who argued that the Cold War rivalry between the US and the former

Soviet Union should be taken into account while interpreting US-Pakistan ties. He further adds that although Pakistan intended to support the US militarily, this desire only came to pass when the US needed a client willing to take military action in the Middle East. Constructing an argument along these lines, he compares Pakistan's military weakness to India's and contends that Pakistan was drawn to this partnership by its desire to strengthen its military position relative to India.<sup>19</sup> However, his interpretation of the Pakistan US alliances and his theory of the state of Pakistan are two different things in a sense that he does not relate the structure of the state of Pakistan with its foreign policy and vice versa.<sup>20</sup>

Danish identifies two issues with Alavi's Framework. First of all, it is static as it doesn't account for how the two states' varying behaviors change. There have been times over the years when Pakistan has acted independently. For instance, Pakistan developed nuclear weapons defying the US pressure. Even though it was an American client, it followed its own Afghan Taliban Policy. Similar to this, the Pakistani military was incensed the US passed the Kerry -

Lugar Act in 2009 and engaged with the civilian administration. Tension increased as a result between the two nations. These contradictions, Danish argues, cannot be rationalized in Alavi's framework.

Secondly, In Alavi's framework, Pakistan is taken as a passive client as he says that the relationship only served the interests of the US.<sup>21</sup> Danish argues that Pakistani military promptly established relationships with the US in order to bolster its power within the newly formed state. He contends that the military's political-economic and geostrategic objectives actively influence US-Pakistan ties. He describes the Pakistani military as an estranged client that only cooperates with its patron when it benefits "idiosyncratic geostrategic and political economy interests of the military of

<sup>17</sup> Tariq Amin-Khan, "The Rise of Militant Islam and the Security State in the Era of the 'Long War,'" *Third World Quarterly* 30, No. 4 (2009): 813–28. URI: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40388151> (January 19, 2019).

<sup>18</sup> Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, "An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron: Shift in the Pakistan-US Relations during the 'War on Terror' " *Journal Of Political Studies* 18, No. 2 (2011): 55-76 ;

<sup>19</sup> Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan-US Military Alliance." *Economic and Political Weekly* 33, No. 25 (1998): 1551-557. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4406909>.

<sup>20</sup> Danish Khan, "Political Economy of US Pakistan Relations: Reformulating the Patron-Client Model", *Economic and Political Weekly* 51, No.30 (July, 2016), 73-77.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

Pakistan”.<sup>22</sup> The military uses networks of patronage to Islamic forces for its dominance. Whether they are ideological or political, these forces are a part of that networking. He says,

“Thereby, if we factor in these ideological and political networks of the military of Pakistan then we can elucidate the “divergent” behaviour of the military in the context of the patron– client relation with the US: developing nuclear capabilities and sustaining the patronage of Islamist militants.”<sup>23</sup>

While the development of nuclear weapons does not fit into Danish's framework, the military's position on the Afghan Taliban and the Kerry-Lugar Bill are good examples of divergent behavior or non-compliance. Danish ignores two things as a result. First of all, the development of nuclear weapons without considering the Indian threat cannot be related to state formation alone. Secondly, his framework is too much focused on the US-Pakistan alliances; it fails to account for Pakistan's relations with other major powers. China provided Pakistan with an alternate military and economic support system during the 1960s, as did the Soviet Union from 1966 to 1969. Similar to this, China encouraged Pakistan's determination to develop nuclear weapons in defiance of American policy. Under such circumstances, even with civilian leaders like Bhutto in office, the US could not put pressure on him to halt Pakistan's nuclear programme if the state's establishment was dependent on the US. In this context, it's crucial to note the influence aspect that TV Paul describes. Paul's thesis would suggest that the US manipulates Pakistan's behavior with the use of its economic and military might. On the other hand, Pakistan has comparatively greater autonomy due to the availability of alternative sources. Danish and Paul don't consider this part of their relationship. Danish may be correct when he says that Pakistan benefits from patronage in strengthening its state structure, which gives the armed forces greater influence. However, compliance and noncompliance are not exclusively related to the military's role in the state formation.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., 75.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 76.

<sup>24</sup> Hamza Alavi, “The State in Post-colonial Societies”, 59–81.

### **PATRONAL COMPETITION, ESTRANGED CLIENT AND STATE FORMATION**

A key component of the patron-client model is competition between major powers. According to Alavi's worldview, the US was mute on China's relationship with Pakistan since it did not conflict with US interests. He describes China's assistance during the 1971 East Pakistan Crisis.<sup>24</sup> Since then China has maintained close relations with Pakistan. Alavi's argument suggests that there was no competition in Pakistan between China and the United States. History shows that when Pakistan established close relations with China while the US was supporting India against China, the state department had termed this happening as the unfortunate breach of the free world. As a response Johnson administration had even stopped economic aid to Pakistan.

This line of argument requires explanation of ‘competitive client patron framework’ which is connected with Danish argument of state formation. In case of China's cooperation with Pakistan, the relevance of Indian rivalry is significant; the US had cold war rivalry and the global war on terror. It is argued that China's patronage was aimed at giving Pakistan the role of a balancer, whereas the US expected Pakistan to act as a surrogate in its strategic competition with the former Soviet Union. Therefore, Pakistan's behavior is explained by its strategic role which is connected to its state formation. When Pakistan undertook to balance out India in its bid to develop nuclear weapons, China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation started against the wishes of the United States.<sup>25</sup> The analogy of weaker military capability vis-a-vis India given by Alavi in case of Pakistan's decision to remain as a client of the US, is relevant also in its decision to go nuclear. Danish's framework is silent on the willingness of another patron to help Pakistan increase its state capabilities. I argue that competitive patronage framework has more explanatory power with regard to the estranged behavior of the State in pursuing military capabilities and economic and political interest.

<sup>25</sup> Rohan joshi, “China, Pakistan, and Nuclear Non-Proliferation”, The Diplomat (2016), URL: <https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/china-pakistan-and-nuclear-non-proliferation/>

Historical evidence suggests that strategic importance, availability of multiple patrons such as the US, China, and the Soviet Union, and the survival of Pakistan's significance for the Western Interests give Pakistan leverage in exercising a modicum of autonomy from its patrons. Soherwordi says that Pakistan's relations with the US are estranged whereas Danish terms Pakistan as an estranged client. Danish argues that an estranged client is that client which complies with the patrons only when role assigned to it serves geo-strategic and socio-economic and political interests. Soherwordi argues that relative power of the US has declined therefore Pakistan behaves independently.<sup>26</sup> Both are concerned with the Pakistan's autonomy but theoretically unable to identify the conditions in which Pakistan is more likely to behave autonomously.

This factor has been recognized by Danish by extending the Alavi's model to Pak-US relations. He relates Pakistan's foreign policy behavior towards US with role of military in the state formation of Pakistan. His work has widened the scope of political economic perspective to more areas such as geo-strategic and political economic interests of the army. He uses the Army's role as a determinant in the US-Pakistan's relations. He argues that Pakistan does not comply with its patron the US when patronal interests clash with those the army's role in the state formation and its geo-political and economic interest. As empirical evidence he takes the issues of nuclear weapons and the Afghan Taliban in which Pakistan did not comply with US therefore it may be termed as an estranged client.

Danish thesis can be challenged on several grounds, first as to how nuclear weapons affects the army's role in the state formation without relating it to Indian nuclear capability, second the US was against Pakistan's use of militant groups as a tool of policy, abandoning them does not necessarily weaken military's role in the state formation. The strategic element of his argument appears more appropriate. It will be more appropriate to argue that Pakistan did not comply with US on the nuclear issue as it had an alternate source of cooperation in the shape of China. The US ignored Pakistan's nuclear program in the 1980s and the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation for its strategic objectives inside Afghanistan. In both cases

the US did not extend nuclear cooperation to Pakistan and was against any other states helping it acquire nuclear capability. Danish ignores China factor while reformulating patron-client relationship. Secondly Pakistan behaves more independently as the US was more dependent upon Pakistan in the Afghan war and the War on terror. Thirdly, Pakistan's decision to get closer to China in the 1960s against the wishes of the US thereby soliciting military and economic help in response to the US decision to support India was not primarily driven by state formation. During the 1960s the US helping Pakistan militarily and economically but the strategic balance vis-à-vis India determined the strengthening of Pakistan China relations. As it is known history that Pakistan was facing tough economic and military sanctions and its economic position was on the verge of collapse, it decided to go for nuclear tests to equalize Indian tests in the 1990s. This it is not known that China's help encouraged Pakistan. It may be argued that Pakistan's behavior was neither driven by its strategic significance for the US, nor the availability of China as an alternative, and the role of military in the state formation but the Indian threat. Moreover, from the international level it does not touch upon the major powers politics as argued that Pakistan's was at the cross road of major powers competition therefore reformulating patron-client model requires the inclusion of major powers competition. This may lead to competitive patron-client framework instead of estranged client model. Other perspective that is poised with strategic sense draws upon either with the Pakistan's strategic interest associated with the US or it is the China factor that gives Pakistan leverage in dealing with the US. According to Soherwordi, Pakistan acts like an estranged client and doesn't follow the lead of its patrons in this regard. In patron-client interactions, he goes on, an estranged client is a situation in which there is dispute between the patron and the client notwithstanding their collaboration. He applies it to Pakistan-US relations and lists certain points of disagreement between the two countries, including the Karry-Lugar Bill, US policy in Afghanistan, backing for the Afghan Taliban, and drone strikes on the Tribal Belt. He argues that the declining power of the US has diminished its ability to exert influence. Soherwordi's

<sup>26</sup> Syed Hussain Shaheed Soherwordi, "An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron: Shift in the Pakistan-US

Relations during the 'War on Terror' " *Journal Of Political Studies* 18, No. 2 (2011): 55-76 ;

work brings a new dimension to patron-client relations by highlighting the relative rise in client power and the relative fall in patron power. Regarding Pakistan, the US comparison overstates the country's capacity and self-sufficiency in terms of its military and economic requirements. It is important to note that Pakistan policy pursued the US interest during Bush tenure as far as the issue of Al-Qaida is concerned but remained reluctant with respect to Afghan Taliban. The fear of decrease in US military and economic assistance is no longer more attractive than the strategic partnership with China. The China Pakistan Economic Corridor CPEC brings Pakistan with more leverage to opt between one or two patrons. However, in that context too Pakistan-US relations continued despite Kerry-Luger Bill, and Pakistan's Afghan policy at the same time Pak-China cooperation is not regarded at the expense of the US.<sup>27</sup> In a similar vein, T.V. Paul contends that Pakistan's strategic importance in the 1980s contributed to the US's failure to influence it through arms sales. Due of Pakistan's diversification of its arms purchases from China, efforts to prevent Pakistan from obtaining nuclear weapons through sanctions have proven to be ineffective in part. Other issues, like China's interest in working with Pakistan on nuclear matters, are not discussed in Paul's study. In this perspective, it's crucial to answer questions like how US-Indian cooperation led China to extend armaments and nuclear cooperation to Pakistan.

**PAKISTAN ON THE US-CHINA SWING AFTER THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN: CONTESTED EXPLANATIONS AND THE APPLICATION OF PATRON-CLIENT RELATIONS**

Pakistan's security worries in addition to those of the United States were heightened by the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. General Zia warned the US that the Soviet Union was moving towards the Indian Ocean months before the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan, but the US disregarded his warnings until the Soviet attack. The US increased its collaboration with China as a result of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. According to

National Security Advisor \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>27</sup> Soherwordi, "An Estranged Client and an Annoyed Patron: 55-76 ;

<sup>28</sup> Niloufer Mahdi "SINO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND," *Pakistan Horizon*39,

Brzezinski, official military cooperation between China and the United States has never been more alluring than now. For China the attack on Afghanistan was a stepping stone of the Soviet thrust to the Arabian Sea through Pakistan. Chinese foreign minister Hang Hua on his visit to Pakistan in January 1980 called upon all countries to provide real support to Afghanistan neighbor to counter the Soviet Union.<sup>28</sup> China believed it was encircled by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and that a counterattack was necessary due to the country's proximity to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet presence meant that the US's dominance in the Middle East was waning. Given a multitude of variables, including US involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Soviet contacts with Middle Eastern states, and the Iranian revolution, the US was left with no choice but to reevaluate its relations with Pakistan.

As mentioned before, US intentions in Pakistan during the 1950s were based on limiting Soviet hegemony in the Middle East, whereas during the 1960s, their goals were centred on constraining China through India. US strategic thinking on the Middle East was altered by the Soviet occupation. After the Sino-Soviet split and rapprochement in the 1970s, the US was only focused on containing the USSR.

Previously, the US was containing both China and the USSR. This is only one more factor that makes the present circumstance unique. This implies that there was a common threat faced by the US and China.

Treating India and the US as regional rivals and using Pakistan as an ally against India was necessary when it came to China. China's security was particularly concerned at the time about the Soviet threat since China had started to work towards better relations with India in the late 1970s. With the assistance of the US, China, and its allies, one may say that Pakistan's role in Afghanistan was to contain the Soviet Union. Another example of Hans Morgenthau's claim that Pakistan and the US had complementary interests in their alliances: Pakistan was concentrating on balancing India and Afghanistan, while the US was worried about Middle Eastern oil security.

No. 4 (1986):68.URL:

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394230>



An additional differentiation between the United States and China is that, while they were rivalling one another in the 1960s, they seemed to be working together to counter a shared threat in the 1980s. As far as Pakistan was concerned, it had to maintain simultaneous relations with both states in a way that would prevent a great power from retaliating against it. As a result, Pakistan's ties to China and the Soviet Union would put it at odds with the latter, which had a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with India. However, if Pakistan had not formed alliances with the US and China, Pakistan would have been surrounded by the Soviet-backed state in Kabul in the west and the Indian threat in the east following the fall of the Shah administration in Iran and the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. Given that Carter and Brzezinski had imposed sanctions and inducements on the nuclear programme, the human rights record during the Zia dictatorship continued to be a contentious issue that led to the cessation of military and financial assistance to Pakistan. On the eve of the attack, Carter's administration provided Pakistan the support it needed to counter the Soviet threat. He declared in his State of the Union speech that if Pakistan's security is in danger, the US will take all necessary action, including using force.

On another occasion, he made an offer of \$400 million US, which General Zia turned down, calling it "peanuts." Additionally, the United States of America proposed to activate the 1959 Bilateral Agreement on the eve of the Soviet invasion on Pakistan.<sup>29</sup> During the 1965 and 1971 wars, Pakistan invoked the 1959 bilateral treaty, a move that was balked by the Nixon and Johnson administrations. India's threat, which was left out of the SEATO and CENTO, was another issue Pakistan had been raising. Pakistan had, in reality, left CENTO a year earlier in order to bolster its credentials for membership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Rejection was muted in response to US calls for a resumption of relations. Pakistan had rather that the US make clear promises of automacy. Yet, Pakistan was to be supported by the Carter administration only under certain conditions.<sup>30</sup>

The Carter administration's response to this predicament was to renounce the Symington Amendment and ignore the issues of nuclear proliferation and human rights. Since India had vehemently objected to the US offer to Pakistan, it also had to cope with the Indian element. Clark Clifford had been despatched by Carter to see the newly appointed Indira Gandhi in India, while the Brzezinski-Christopher mission was debating issues pertaining to collaboration. The mission's intended augmentation of US activities in Pakistan was seen with resentment by Pakistanis. The reason is that Pakistan was worried about the Indian threat in addition to the Soviet threat. Therefore, it was clear that the Zia dictatorship would wait for the results of the US Presidential election, which brought the Reagan administration to power, before forging any substantial relationships with the Carter administration.<sup>31</sup>

Reagan's government obtained a congressional exemption from the Symington Amendment, also known as the anti-proliferation amendment, in order to resume defence ties with Pakistan, which had been on hold since the Indo-Pak War of 1965. Reagan was able to relax the aid embargo against Pakistan, which had been in place since April 1979 due to that country's efforts to develop a nuclear programme, thanks to the waiver. The US then consented to provide \$3.2 billion in help over a six-year period. Both military and financial support were provided. Congress then approved transactions totaling \$11 billion for purchases of foreign military hardware, with Saudi Arabia bearing a share of the cost. Pakistan was able to acquire guided missiles, radars, armoured carriers, self-propelled howitzers, medium tanks, helicopters, and guided missiles thanks to this aid package. Both advocates and detractors of the aid programme existed in the US. Critics contended that providing help could jeopardise attempts to prevent proliferation and spark an arms race between Pakistan and India. Proponents held the view that Pakistan is the only Muslim nation with an armed forces capable of absorbing cutting-edge military hardware, and that doing so would fortify its borders against Afghan and Soviet threats as well as Soviet

<sup>29</sup> Mohammad Islam, "PAKISTAN-US NEW CONNECTION: AN EVALUATION." *Pakistan Horizon* 36, No. 2 (1983): 34.  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/41394188>.

<sup>30</sup> Thomas Perry Thornton, "Between the Stools?: U.S. Policy towards Pakistan during the Carter Administration." *Asian Survey* 22, No. 10 (1982): 959–77. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2643754>

<sup>31</sup> Ibid.

expansion. Pakistan's ambition to develop a nuclear weapons programme will probably be weakened by the provision of conventional weapons.

Additionally, the supporters held the following beliefs: i) Pakistan can serve as a conduit for US assistance to Mujahedeen; ii) Pakistan's territory could be used for RDF in an emergency; iii) Pakistan's Soviet control over Pakistan will negatively affect US commercial and military interests in the Persian Gulf; and iv) a credible defence of Pakistan would enhance US prestige in the Arab states and China.<sup>32</sup>

From the standpoint of the patron-client relationship

the complementarity of interests once again resuscitated, as Pakistan sought to counterbalance India, counter any threat originating from its western border, and strengthen its internal security framework. Following the nuclear detonation, Pakistan felt particularly threatened by India, which was said to view itself as the dominant power in South Asia. In support of this argument, Ainslee Embree, the counsellor for cultural affairs in New Delhi, testified before the Congress that India views itself as a hegemon and expresses concern that there should not be a really autonomous state within its borders. Pakistan is opposed to the Indian version of Munroe doctrine and considers it a security threat which needs to be balanced. To meet the Indian threat while pursuing the US goals in Afghanistan Pakistan needed flexibility from the US regarding its nuclear program, military and economic assistance, and controlling the Baloch insurgents. For the US the containment of Soviet Union was the desired objectives and abandoning nuclear program by Pakistan. In this context if we reflect on Carney's argument that major powers gave priorities to strategic interests over ideological appears true.<sup>33</sup>

If we look back to the 1950s Pakistan's entry into the US sponsored alliances system was tantamount to going against China and the USSR similarly as mentioned earlier in the 1960s Pakistan China relations were not welcomed by the US. It may be argued that during the 1960s Pakistan's relations with China were framed under the major powers

<sup>32</sup> T. V. Paul, "Influence through Arms Transfers: Lessons from the U.S.-Pakistani Relationship", *Asian Survey* 32, No. 12 (Dec., 1992): 1084. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645039>

<sup>33</sup> Robert G. Wirsing and James M. Roherty, "The United States and Pakistan", *International Affairs (Royal*

confrontation. However after the US-China rapprochement during the 1970s and 1980s, Pakistan US relations would not change the image of Pakistan in China. Even in the 1950s China had little concerns about Pakistan's entry into SEATO as it was a dominant opinion that Pakistan was preoccupied with threat from India only. It is apt to invoke Carney and Shoemaker's argument that formation of Patron Client relationship changes the image of a third party, in case of Pak-US relations it was witnessed that change of image occurred in India as it had opposed the US arms supply to Pakistan, and had rushed into the Soviet proposed treaty of friendship and cooperation after Pakistan had brought both the US and China closer. India not only opposed the US support to Pakistan but also cancelled negotiations on Kashmir in 1954. Indian Prime Minister Nehru claimed the situation in South Asia has changed and that Pakistan wanted to negotiate from the position of power. Once again, the US-Pakistan-China alliance that emerged in the 1970s was the driving force behind India's signing of a defence pact with the Soviet Union. The Indian government and its congressional lobby opposed the Reagan Administration's request for a congressional waiver to provide Pakistan with military and economic aid. Pakistan has proposed a South Asian nuclear weapons-free zone and no war treaty in order to allay Indian fears and worries. Additionally, it restated Pakistan's claim that its nuclear programme is for peaceful purposes. Pakistan succeeded in persuading the international community that its nuclear programme was being pursued for benign reasons. Thus, it seemed that US backing for Pakistan would not be hindered by Indian worries or the nuclear issue.<sup>34</sup>

Another characteristic of this relationship was that Pakistan had more leverage on the United States comparatively to what it had been in the 1950s. Pakistan did not show enthusiasm for the US help and attempted to bolster its non-aligned credentials. It did not provide bases to the US instead it accepted the assistance package from the US. From Pakistan point of view the US had not honored its

*Institute of International Affairs 1944-*) 58, No. 4 (1982): 588-609. URL: <https://doi.org/10.2307/2618471>

<sup>34</sup> Noor A Husain, "PAKISTAN-US SECURITY RELATIONS: Arms Sales, Bases, Nuclear Issues", *Strategic Studies* 8, No. 3 (1985): 25-30. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45182335>

commitments during the 1965 and 1971 wars therefore it was reluctant to go into the US alliances. President Zia stated that "There is no war in Pakistan. We do not want to create a war phobia". At an occasion he repeated the frequent Pakistani complaint that the U.S. has been an unfaithful ally, letting down Pakistan during its 1965 and 1971 wars with India".<sup>35</sup> At the same time he tried to tie the military assistance with long term economic aid. He was of the view that Pakistan needs to modernize its military but also durable economic power to meet the challenges posed in the aftermath of the Soviet attack on Afghanistan.<sup>36</sup> On the other hand as the Carter's administration had imposed sanction on Pakistan due to latter's bid for nuclear weapons and dubious human rights record, the strategic compulsion of the US was so high that Pakistan got congressional waiver and proceeded with developing nuclear weapons.

According to Amna Mehmood, the United States declared in the 1990s that it would not obstruct the IMF financial assistance package, even though Pakistan had been repeatedly threatened with sanctions. The US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright believed that the sanctions will backfire, The French President was of the same opinion, believing that Pakistan might sell its expertise to other nations. This occurred when it was apprehended that Pakistan, as a nuclear weapons state, would fail and that its weapons would end up in the wrong hands. Mehmood contributes yet another important element. Along with patronal competition it was the significance of Pakistan to influence the behavior of the US. However, her research is limited to a particular incident yet it provides ample amount of theoretical insight to connect some aspects of Pakistan's foreign policy behavior.

As it is a known history and much has been written about the post-Cold war policies of the US towards South Asia, the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the end of Cold war reduced the significance of Pakistan. The US policy remained focused on nuclear non-

proliferation as discussed in the previous section, the issue of human rights and reconfiguring its relations with India. The policy of Narasimha Rao to economic recovery received positive signs from the US. Whereas India jumped into the bandwagon of the US after the Moscow's prowess had dwindled away.<sup>37</sup> In the meanwhile as mentioned earlier that Pakistan was put under sanctions by the US due to its nuclear program the issue of Kashmir had also become the issue of human rights at the International level. Pakistan was raising the issue at human rights fora and in fact had moved resolution in UNHRC in 1994 against India. Pakistan's ardent supporter of the issue China was persuaded by India to convince Pakistan to withdraw its resolution. China's policy was shaped by India's support when a resolution of UN General Assembly condemning China for Human Rights abuses was opposed by India in 1993. Pakistan was thus compelled to withdraw the resolution due to China's and Iran's inability to support Pakistan and the US's decision to abstain from the voting. Simultaneously to the occasion of Narasimha Rao's travel to Washington, the joint communiqué cited bilateral talks as a means of resolving remaining problems, such as Kashmir between India and Pakistan.<sup>38</sup>

Pakistan associated the Kashmir dispute with its nuclear programme, which the US disregarded and handled the two issues separately. The US delegation made it apparent that it would not tolerate aligning Pakistan's nuclear programme decision with India's when it came to caps on nuclear programmes. Following their nuclear weapons tests, Pakistan and India decided to engage in talks that resulted in Vajpayee's 1999 visit to Lahore. Both states agreed to begin talks on all matters, according to the joint declaration released. As this was going on, both states were accusing one another of violating the Line of Control, which led to the Kargil War of 1999. In addition to putting both countries in danger of a nuclear exchange, the war caused alarm on a global scale. India persuaded the US and the G-

<sup>35</sup> Stuart Auerbach, "Pakistan Ties Arms Aid To Economic Assistance", *The Washington Post*, January 14, 1980.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>Farzana Shakoor, "Pakistan-US Relations: An Interpretation," *Pakistan Horizon* 54, No. 1 (2001): 19–32. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393979> .

<sup>38</sup>Farzana Shakoor, "Kashmir Issue and US Global Objectives," *Pakistan Horizon* 47, No. 3 (1994): 73–84. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41393488>.74-78.

8 to press Pakistan to remove its Armed Forces from across the Line of Control. The US warned Pakistan to prevent the IMF from issuing a tranche of \$100 million. President Clinton had sent the US Central Command General Zini, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, G. Lanphar as personal Envoy to meet Nawaz Sharif and the Army Chief and other important official to withdraw forces unconditionally from Kargil. The G-8 meeting also asked Pakistan to withdraw its troops and respect the LOC. Left with little option Nawaz Sharif visited the US and met the US president on July 4 1999 in which agreement on defusing the crises was reached. On the call of Nawaz Sharif forces from forward position started withdrawing.<sup>39</sup>

The US began pressuring Pakistan to cease aiding terrorists, and both India and the US adopted the same position about the Jihadi network in Kashmir, equating it with terrorism. Regarding Kashmir, Pakistan had higher expectations from the Clinton administration; but, during his tour to India and Pakistan, he informed Pakistani officials while in Islamabad that the US would neither arbitrate or resolve the conflict in Kashmir. The rationale for this was that Pakistan's support of Islamic fundamentalism was viewed as detrimental to US interests. The second reason was that, as India grew in significance relative to Pakistan, it seemed more appropriate to back India's position in the US-India relationship.<sup>40</sup>

## **CONCLUSION**

### **PAKISTAN'S DIVE INTO POLICING CLIENT**

Pakistan used a network of proxies to further its geostrategic objectives during the Afghan War, in addition to enhancing its military capabilities. According to some writers, Islamic organizations served as the regime's domestic hegemonic apparatus and strategic assets in Kashmir and Kabul. Pakistan was effective in drawing attention to the Kashmir issue on a global scale, but India was favored by the shifting interests of key nations in the region.

Pakistan's attempts to engage India in talks regarding the Kashmir problem have not been effective. Additionally, by establishing deterrence against

India, Pakistan was able to compel it to agree to the Lahore Declaration. Although the US and other western nations exerted pressure on Pakistan during the Kargil War, it had little effect on the country's resolve to proceed with nuclear tests. Regarding Pakistan-China collaboration in the nuclear and missile domains, Pakistan had options besides the United States. Beyond providing Pakistan with conventional weapons and economic support, the US has never helped the country acquire nuclear weapons.

Pakistan obtained economic and military support from the United States during the Afghan War, although the only assistance it received from the US was the lifting of non-proliferation sanctions. With sanctions in place and a threat to stop the IMF from giving loans if the Kargil crisis went unresolved, the US exerted pressure. The US was able to exert its influence in certain areas of the crisis while failing to do so in others. It is noteworthy that during the earlier stages of the Cold War, Pakistan had more leverage to secure backing from competitor patrons. However, in that by the 1990s, China's assistance was restricted to conventional military support. Due to China's reluctance because of the Uyghur Muslim issue, there was no international solidarity in the international fora to support Pakistan's Kashmir cause. Furthermore, Pakistan found itself alone in the face of US influence while China prioritised economic development above geopolitical concerns. For this reason, during the Kargil War, Pakistan gave in to US pressure.

Besides, the Kargil problem was more about Pakistan's survival against India than it was about India and Pakistan's strategic balance. It can therefore be claimed that in the absence of competition, Pakistan is more inclined to act in a non-compliant manner towards its patrons when those patrons' interests' conflict with Pakistan's ability to survive.

The following inference can be made from the discussion above. Pakistan defied US demands in the 1980s in part because China offered Pakistan an alternate supply of armaments and because strategic benefits from relations with Pakistan outweighed the costs. Pakistan was successful in the 1990s in defying US nuclear weapons sanctions because of the US and

<sup>39</sup>Ershad Mahmud, "Post-Cold War US Kashmir Policy." *Policy Perspectives* 2, No. 1 (2005): 83–110. URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/42909143>.

<sup>40</sup> Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, "Anatomizing Pakistan's Motivations for Nuclear Weapons," *Pakistan Horizon* 64, no. 2 (2011): 5–19.

the widespread belief in the West that sanctions could force Pakistan to fail as a nation or that Pakistan might use nuclear weapons as a means of obtaining economic assistance.

It is also possible to conclude that Pakistan disregarded its patrons when the relationship failed to advance its geostrategic goals and meet the demands of the hegemonic apparatus, including its military, economic, and strategic interests. Pakistan's foreign policy objectives can be linked to its autonomous behaviour, creating a complex web of variables that determine Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. The former may be related to circumstances in which Pakistan asserts or avoids the US influence in its foreign policy behaviour. Notwithstanding the many disputed explanations, Pakistan's entry as a client can be said to have been influenced by its military, economic, and geostrategic interests as well as by US pressure that was essentially backed by the world community. Although there are striking parallels between this instance and Pakistan's 1980s involvement in the US-led proxy war in Afghanistan, the conditions and circumstances that gave rise to the US-Pakistan alliances were very different. It is possible to give the historical cognition-shaped heuristics to support similarity.<sup>41</sup>

Pakistan's foreign policy, however, underwent a significant change as a result of the post-9/11 alliance. Pakistan was ruled by military dictatorships during both eras, along with Pakistan's military, economic, and geostrategic interests, all of which appear identical, but Pakistan's role as a client was different. Even so, the US and its interests inside Afghanistan continued to be the same. The function formerly known as the strategic client was replaced by the policing client. Pakistan had to fulfil its duty outside of its borders in the previous scenario, but after 9/11, it was necessary for Pakistan to fulfil its role inside its borders.

A further feature of this relationship was that, in contrast to the 1980s, Pakistani territory was home to the patronal targets of the post-9/11 era. Other factors that are significant include how US-Indian relations, drone strikes, incidents like the Salala incident that claimed the lives of several Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan's position on the Afghan Taliban, and the

strengthening of China-Pakistan strategic partnership will play out in terms of the complementarity of interests that leads to client estrangement and patronal annoyance.

As previously mentioned, the client state provides military bases so that its clients can station their troops there. The post-9/11 partnership was predicated on providing ports, logistical channels, and military bases in addition to granting authority to use airspace and intelligence to target Al-Qaida members. Prior assistance was primarily focused on a state, but after September 11, 2001, collaboration was focused on the Taliban government in Afghanistan and Al-Qaida, a non-state organisation. Pakistan's collaboration was utilised to aid the insurgents during the Cold War, but after 9/11, it was intended to dismantle Al-Qaida and put an end to the conflict inside Afghanistan. Pakistan was also required to conduct military operations and give intelligence to the US regarding Al-Qaida operatives. Establishing order is the purpose of this role reversal. From that perspective, Pakistan's involvement in 9/11 is seen as a client of the police. Since establishing order is primarily the responsibility of the police, Pakistan's cooperative goals also seem to fall under this category. The Cold War's fundamental strategic imperatives, which were covered in detail in the previous section, are referred to as strategic client. Pakistan had demonstrated compliance on some issues and non-compliance on others in both positions. As previously said, Pakistan's hegemonic state apparatus requirements and the relationship's results for its military, economic, and geostrategic goals determined the compliance factor. When its interactions aided the previously stated goals, Pakistan had historically cooperated with the US. But issues about why US pressure was unable to change Pakistan's behaviour have been addressed by pointing to Pakistan's importance to the US, the existence of a substitute patron, and the importance of Pakistan's survival to Western interests.

<sup>41</sup> Helen E. Purkitt and James W. Dyson, "The Role of Cognition in U.S. Foreign Policy toward Southern

Africa," *Political Psychology* 7, no. 3 (1986): 507–32, <https://doi.org/10.2307/3791254>.

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