

# ELECTORAL FRAUD: A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO DYNASTIC POLITICS IN DISTRICT KARAK-KPK, PAKISTAN (A QUANTITATIVE STUDY)

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#### **ABSTRACT**

The study was formulated with the aim to evaluate the Electoral fraud as a contributing factor to Dynastic politics in District Karak-KPK, Pakistan. The respondents of study comprised of contestants and winners of Provincial and National Assemblies of District Karak in General Election 2013 as well as winners of the Local Government Election 2015 of District Karak. The total population of study composed 467 politicians, for which sample size of 196 respondents was proportionally allocated to each category and then randomly selected. The conceptual framework of the study comprised a dependent variable (Electoral Fraud) and an independent variable (Dynastic Politics). The data was collected through interview schedule, where study variables were measured using a Likert scale. The collected data was analyzed by using Uni-variate (frequencies and percentages) and Bi-veriate techniques. Chi Square test was used to ascertain associations among study variables. The Chi Square test for association of independent variables and dependent variable shows a highly significant association (P=0.000) was found between intimidation at the polls using private militant gangs or even state security is common. The study recommended awareness raising of general public and the role of mass media regarding voters responsibilities, bringing reforms in policies and laws related to political parties and election. Furthermore, ensure voters security and establishment of political ethics and discouragement of political posting and transfer of judiciary and bureaucracy.

Keywords: Electoral Fraud, Dynastic Politics, & Chi-Square Test

#### INTRODUCTION

The Oxford Dictionary (2014) defines "dynasty" as, "A line of hereditary leaders of a nation." Cranston (2016) defines a political dynasty as having no less than four generations successively in the immediate line, chose to state affairs or government office. A dynasty is a process goes down from generation to generation andhas been related to government affairs and characterized patrilineally. Inheritance and kinship were primarily seen and legitimately calculated through descent from common inheritor in the male line. In the study of Political science, there

is no standard definition for what constitutes a political dynasty. Hess (1997) defined a dynasty is; a family with no less than four individuals, in a common and similar surname that elected to government office.

While Dal Bo et al., (2009) stated that a dynastic official as one who has related with a family that occupied a seat of Congress in past. Clubok et al., (1969) viewed that individual from Congress who was connected as children, grandsons, nephews, siblings or first cousins. Smith (2012) defined a

political dynasty that in a dynastic politics, at least two relatives serving in national office. Similarly, Casey (2008) stated that political family as at least two people related by blood or marriage, in a first or second generation, either as a candidate or incumbent at the regional, state or national level politics. These variations and interpretations show that there is no evident meaning of what constitutes a dynastic political tradition. However, there is uncertainty and difficulty between a political family and a dynastic political administration. However, the definition of Hess (1997) requires no less than four individuals from a similar family and he didn't talk about a multi generational condition, which would in this manner permit a family with a single generation of four relatives and kins in elect office to be called as a dynastic administration.

Additionally, Hess (1997) argued that multi generational political ancestry gives a more systematic examination of dynasty, rather than family, through the possible idea of pseudo aristocratic lineagein the appearance of democracy. Cranston (2016) definition incorporates just those elected relatives in the direct line, i.e. grandfather child grandson, and doesn't include indirect kins and relatives, for example, nieces and nephews, or inlaws. Cranston (2016) excluded and avoids those families where there is a generational break. For instance, the Manning family had four progressive generations chose and elected as a governor and head of South Carolina, but none was in the immediate line; and while the Archer-Chamberlain family had four generations serve in the US Congress, just three were consecutive. Political dynasties is that individuals from a similar family possessing elected political positions successively for a similar position or at the same time across various positions' have become a general characteristics in many developing nations. Modern industrial nations additionally have their political lines; though, the phenomena appear to be most prevailing in as still developing and younger democracy system (Mendoza etal., 2012).

Dynastic legislator are those whose relatives have served in similar political position in the past and occupy a substantial part of political offices in electoral regions. Political dynasts affect election results, its policy and get political advantages. Dynastic legislatures are enjoying higher electoral advantage and success because they bring more

advantages to their voters rather than non political dynasts. Dynastic legislature harms economic policy and financial condition of the country; in spite of the huge amount of distributive advantages and benefits they bring (Asako et al., 2010).

Pakistan's present agreeing to a national framework of decentralization by eighteenth Amendment (Yang, 2010) has to some degree undermined the fundamental of holding intraparty elections. At the time of constitutional amendment in 2010, there was a constitutional fundamental to hold internal election contest inside political parties. Just independent, honest, powerful and effective commissions can direct the issues of political parties and in the long time take into consideration the development of a less clientelistic method of politics. Also, the court too has an indispensable part to check cases of conflict situation, nepotism, rules violation and general exemption from punishment through which Pakistan powerful political families runs their parties. It is very important that parties expand popular support base outside the boundary of their specific ethnic, clannish pockets or sectarian (Altaf,

General elections are a sine qua non for the advancement and growth of a more plural and comprehensive democratic inclination and culture. Frequent interruption in Pakistan's democracy would leads to simply ensure that political oligarchies remain in business, either as the military persons or as martyr's people of democracy (Brooks, 2008). The uniqueness of political aristocracy of Pakistan relies on upon their fanaticism. A few rich families have ruled over Pakistan's legislature since the creation of the country in 1947 (Hussain, 1985). These families generally are from rural landowning and have ethnical surroundings. In the twenty first century the political environment remains changing and largely commutable. In fact, the major change might be the expansion of dynastic rule to merge families from urban, religious and military establishments. The politics of kinship in Pakistan, as in South Asia is powerfully attached in the politics of Clientelism; which is related to ethnicity, character, name recognition and caste (Mufti, 2009). A prominent Pashtun nationalist and politician in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Asfandyar Wali Khan, whose claim over and leads a political party, i.e. Awami National Party (ANP) is also dynastic (Diplomat

News, 2010). Asfandyar Wali Khan is the son of Abdul Wali Khan (Malik, 1990) and grandson of Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan was a close friend of Gandhi and also associated partner of the Indian National Congress in the mid twentieth century. The ANP was led by Beegum Naseem Wali (Wali Khan's wife) before Asfandyar Wali Khan. After the demise of Wali Khan, Khan was appointed as a chief of party due to intra dynasty conflict.

The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) is considered one of the leading religious political parties and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) (Akhtar, 2015) is no exemptions either. The leadership of JUI was inherited to Maulana Fazlur Rahman from his father, Mufti Mahmud. When some of the companion refused to accept and resist ideologies, he then established his own party, i.e. Jamiat Ulema-e-IslamFazlur Rahman (JUIF) and remains one of the active and dynamic political party of Pakistan. Similarly, the leadership of JUP was transferred to Anas Noorani from his father Shah Ahmad Noorani. However, the case of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) is different from the rest of religious parties and generally considered non dynastic political party, further the party encouraged the rise of Samia Raheela Qazi, daughter of Qazi Hussain Ahmad to the position of a Member of Parliament (Rumi, 2011).

#### LITERATURE REVIEW

Electoral fraud is a process through which a political actors interfered illegally during election process which results to manipulate public mandate. Dynastic political elites fraudulently change an election results and vote counts. They reduce the vote share of opposing political party, mould the ideas of voters and increased the number of votes for the favored candidates. Dynastic elite casting votes by underage and unregistered masses which are neither eligible to register nor even registered to vote. Party workers snatched ballot boxes stuffed with thumb printed votes to ensure wining of their party candidates. Some more specialized tactics are being usedby dynasts to capture public consent such as intimidation at the polls using gangs, scaring registered voters from polling their votes against them and snatching of results before due time of collection to favor dynastic candidates. Media are used as a major tool to publish/announce the incorrect results and propagate the wrong candidates as a winner before the correct results announced by Election Commission (Casimir et al., 2013).

The Nigeria election from 1999 to the 2007 and political scene has greatly downfrom standard to below standard and has moved towards greater violence. The level and degree of political and electoral violence has risen and the dynastic politicians have frequently used poor, destitute and unemployed Nigerian young generations for the perpetration of electoral violence. This is associated with the political structure and institution that in the theory has failed participation in politics and it has practiced that the dynastic elites forming violent gangs and perpetrators of electoral violence. The study of the political antecedents shows evidence of political and constituent violencein Nigeria before 1999. There were frequent degrees of brutality and political/religious gap between the Muslim and Christian on the one side and North and South on the other side. The practice of violence in the past is such that cut across, electoral, sectarian and political, whereas in the latter, the violent activities of the rebellion(freedom fighters) rises simply for the control of the assets to incorporate both secret and overt contribution in perpetrating constituent brutality (Aniekwe & Kushie, 2011).

In a local body election a little amount of deception might be sufficient to change the outcome. Electoral frauds have damaging effects if not stopped through punishment, as it can diminish the confidence of voters in democracy. So the perception and inclination towards electoral fraud by dynastic ruler leads to undermine. However, electoral fraud is not just limited to the circle of political polls and can happen in any political selection where the possible votegain is valued the risk for the deceiver; election for sports judging, labors union, student committees, and the granting of merit to music, film, books, or television (TV) programs. Despite of examining different frauds it is very difficult phenomena to understand. This follows from innate misdeed. Brutal punishments aimed forpreventing fraud make it likely that people who perpetrate electoral fraud do as such with the desire that it either will not be exposed or will be pardoned (Skulkin,2018).

### UNIVERSE OF THE STUDY

To outline perception of respondents towards dynastic politics and itsunderlying factors, District Karak of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa was chosen as the universe for this research activity.

#### NATURE OF THE RESPONDENTS

The study population comprised of the people with following characteristics.

Contestants of National and Provincial Assemblies of District Karak in GeneralElection 2013.

Winners of the Local Government Election 2015 of District Karak.

The secondary data was collected from Election Commission of Pakistan. A total 63 respondents contested National and Provincial Assemblies election and 404 respondents were elected in Local Government election. The distribution of study population in two strata is given in Table-3.1.

### SAMPLE SIZE AND SAMPLING SELECTION

The study population on the above described criteria is 467 for which a sample size of 196 is required as per Sekaran (2003) criteria. The sample size was proportionally allocated to each stratum (Table-3.1). The distribution of sample size indeed stratum is presented in the Table-3.1. The required sample from each stratum was selected by using lottery method of sample random sampling.

**Table 3.1** *Distribution of population and sample size* 

Respondents	Total	Sample	Size
Category	Respondents		
Contestants	f63	26	
National an	d		
Provincial			
Assemblies			
Winners of Loca	ıl404	170	
Government			
Election			
Total respondents	467	196	

#### TOOLS FOR DATA COLLECTION

The research study consisted of four independent variables (Electoral Fraud) and a dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) as given in conceptual framework (Table-3.2). A mix method approach was used in which both qualitative and quantitative data was

collected. For collecting quantitative data interview schedule was designed to cover all the study variables as given in the conceptual frame work. The interview schedule was pretested for its reliability and consistency of questions and edited accordingly.

**Table 3.2** *Conceptual Frame Work* 

Conceptual Frame Work				
<b>Independent variables</b>	Dependent variable			
Electoral Fraud	Dynastic Politics			

#### RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

**Uni-variate analysis** 

This section is about the Uni-variate analysis of the dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) and independent variable (Electoral Fraud).

The illegal interference of politicians during electoral process robs the mandate of voters. Some political elites manipulate the election process in favor of their candidates by employing corrupt process, such processes involve illegal increase in own votes through adding fake votes. It is also experienced that unregistered citizen caste vote and the environment of fear is created among the voters. Electoral violence threatens the political order and peace pave the way for fraud and the data and figures are manipulated to deny the rightful winners.

The Table-4.21 shows the perception of respondents regarding electoral fraud. The results show that respondents agreed that there were 71.4% intimidation at the polls by using private militant gangs or even state security, 19.9% respondents had no such fear and 8.7% respondents were neutral. In addition, 63.3% respondents opined that during election process illegal interference of politician lead to seize public mandate, 28.1% disagreed to the statement and the rest 8.7% respondents were uncertain. The politicians increase vote bank through misappropriate involvement during electoral process and captured power of consent of masses. Coronel et al., (2007) argued that in the formation of political dynasties party candidates try to interfere during electoral process and use a huge combination of factors like money and vote buying, political machinery and pressure, violence and fear, popularity, myths, alliances and soon.

The result further explains that 66.8% respondents opined that media manipulation to announce or publish the wrong results and the wrong candidates as winners before the proper collation of results by the Electoral Commission is prevailing, while 26.5% respondents disagreed to the statement and 6.6% had noopinion. Media is playing a key role in molding people's opinion. It exaggerates result and gives advantage to undeserved politician. Diamond et al., (2014) stated that the role of media is very important everywhere in building the foundation of political dynasties. Media are projecting politician and their images in a very good way and promoting certain personalities. Also, 58.7% respondents opined that politician coerces unregistered masses for casting vote, while 25.5% did not support this statement and 15.8% respondents were neither agreeing nor disagreeing to the statement. It is highly observed that politician used unfair means during electoral contest for achieving their objectives (i.e. increase number of vote). The result is supported by Coronel et al., (2007) that dynastic candidates increase the numbers of vote through mass voting by unregistered citizens as well as using under age vote.

Likewise, 73.0% respondents explained that the authorities involved in promoting frauds during election, 20.9% were disagreed to statement and 6.1% were unsure. Furthermore, 56.6% respondents argued that nobody dared to stop unfair election, while 35.7% disagreed and 8.7% respondents had no idea about the statement. It is indicative of the fact that rules and regulations are not followed to stop unfair means in election. In addition, 74.5% respondents acknowledged that bureaucracy is involved in favoring election of a specific party government, while 17.3% respondents reported that there was no such practice and 8.2% argued neither in favor nor against the statement. Bureaucracy involvement is highly acknowledged in favoring a specific political party election. It is the bureaucracy that moulds the opinion of masses to favor some politician or manipulate the overall results.

In addition, 58.7% respondents explained that state didn't try to control candidates from such violation during election, 32.7% respondents argued that state tried to control candidates from violations and the rest 8.7% did not expressed their views. The results show that state role is partial in election. It seems that state promote and increase vote bank of specific

political party. Rodrik (2007) argued that the potential government institutions like Police, Prosecutor and Bureaucracy are not performing well to prevent and investigate any illegal interference during election. It is the politicization of Bureaucracy because it do not play role as a bridge between people and government.

Moreover, 76.5% respondents opined that election staff used fraudulent techniques to favors party, 16.3% respondents negated this view and the rest 7.1% were not sure. On the other hand 69.9% respondents acknowledged that bogus polling was common, 21.9% reported absence of such practice, while 8.2% were neither agreed nor disagreed to the statement. Bogus polling is frequently practiced by politician and mobilized masses towards such practices. Bogus polling gives advantage to dynastic politicians during electoral process.

Likewise, 73.5% respondents opined that force was used to poll bogus vote while, 19.9% didn't agree to the statement and 6.6% were undecided. It is indicative the fact that politicians are involved in using force to poll bogus vote. Force is used as a tool to scare masses and take advantage of their consent. Similarly, 73.0% respondents argued that opposition votes were destroyed by using force, while 22.4% explained opposition votes weren't destroyed by using force and the rest 4.6% respondents were uncertain. The results show that force is used to destroy opposition vote. Major political figures try to lessen the numbers of vote of opponents and disobeying election rules and regulations. Electoral fraud is a tool used by dynasts to get minimum votes and defeat opponents. In this endeavor the help of administrationand political government is solicited to change the number of votes or poll fake votes.In addition, use of force can also change the actual results in favor of dynasts.

**Table 4.1**Frequency and percentage distribution of the respondents regarding electoral fraud

S.No	Electoral Fraud	Yes	No	Uncertain
	Intimidation at the polls using private militant gangs or even state security is common?		39(19.9%)	17(8.7%)

2	During election	124(63.3%)	55(28.1%)	17(8.7%)
	process illegal			
	interference of			
	politician lead to			
	seizepublic mandate?			
3	Media manipulation	131(66.8%)	52(26.5%)	13(6.6%)
	to announce orpublish			
	the wrong results and			
	the wrong candidates			
	as winners before the			
	proper collation of			
	results by the			
	Electoral Commission			
	is prevailing?			
4	Politician coerces	115(58.7%)	50(25.5%)	31(15.8%)
	unregistered masses		, ,	
	for casting vote?			
5	The	143(73.0%)	41(20.9%)	12(6.1%)
	authorities		, ,	
	are involved			
	in			
	promoting fraud,			
	during election?			
6	Nobody dare to stop	109(56.6%)	70(35.7%)	17(8.7%)
	unfair election?			
7	Bureaucracy is	146(74.5%)	34(17.3%)	16(8.2%)
	involved in favoring			
	election of a specific			
	party government?			
8	State doesn't try to	115(58.7%)	64(32.7%)	1 <mark>7(8.7</mark> %)
	control candidates			
	from such violation			Intern
	during election?			Issues
9	The election	150(76.5%)	32(16.3%)	14(7.1%)
	staff			
	uses			
	fraudulent			
	techniques to favor a			
	party?			
10	Bogus polling is	137(69.9%)	43(21.9%)	16(8.2%)
	common?	1.4.4/50.50:	20(10.00)	10/5 (0/)
11	Force is used to poll	144(73.5%)	39(19.9%)	13(6.6%)
1.0	bogus vote?	1.40/50 000	11/02 15::	0 (4 50)
12	Opposition votes are	143(73.0%)	44(22.4%)	9(4.6%)
	destroyed by using			
	force?			1

<sup>\*</sup>Values in the table present frequency while values in the parenthesis represent percentages proportion

### **Bi-Variate Analysis of Respondents**

Bi-Variate analysis seeks association between dependent variable (Dynastic Politics) and independent variables (Electoral Fraud) were worked out through cross tabulation (Chi-square test). Discussion of the variable with suitable reason is discussed below.

### Association between Dynastic Politics and Electoral Fraud

The fast development of our electoral system consisting of insecure and needy voters, much poor citizens and increasing political rivalry has increased the cost of campaigning and incumbency for the political leaders acting as patrons of their constituents. Politicians spend an inordinate amount of money in order to have an effective political campaign because of the need to compete with or engage in vote buying, electoral fraud, and coercion. On the other hand, political success opens opportunities and resources to enable political dynasties to consolidate and expand their economic and power bases. Some political dynasties practicing unfair and illegal means to keep continue their political competitions like: corruption, nepotism, fraud, violence, vote-buying and intimidation.

Association between dynastic politics and electoral fraud indicate in Table-4.26 that dynastic politics had a significant association with bogus polling as common practice (P=0.025) and opposition votes were destroyed by using force (P=0.014). Fake polling is a real problem. Politicians raise slogans and threaten voters at polling booth. Sometime they snatch voters-list of opposite party to decrease the number of voters. In some instances votes of deceased, migrated or absent voters are casted by political dynasts to get the lead. Personal security or even state security is used to disperse voters of opponents in some cases. The result shows that Electoral Code of Conduct is essential for free and fair election but the bureaucracy and administration are committing electoral offences. Government institutions are responsible for healthydemocracy but they do not ensure such practices to stop unfair means during electoral process. Coronel (2007) stated that force, violence, fear and threats are the major tools for elite politician through which increase the number of votes, switch of result before, snatching of ballot boxes and so on is doing for the sake of favoring ruling party and increasing vote bank of the candidates. Electoral staff and Returning Officers are responsible to manage, detect and prevent fraud at the day of election but they are involved to favor a specific political party through committing such electoral crimes. However, the responsible institutions of government also do not try to investigate and identify any suspicious behavior

and potential electoral offence. Electoral fraud contributing in promotion of dynastic politics within states through polling bogus votes by politician through common masses and dynastic candidates using force to destroythe opposition votes which leads to dynastic political system.

Moreover, a highly significant association (P=0.000) was found between intimidation at the polls using private militant gangs or even state security and dynastic politics. The result suggests that dynastic politicians coerces and threaten voters at polling booth for the purpose of interfering to favor their concern candidate. The force is used to disperse opponent voters or forced voters in their favor. In some instances ballet papers and ballet boxes are snatched, replaced or destroyed to change the results. The result is supported by Acemoglu et al., (2006) that voter intimidation is verycommon at Election Day and politicians violate laws and prohibit citizens from casting vote against them. Vote polls by underage and unregistered masses are tactics for increasing own party votes. Whereas, vote-share of opposite party and candidates are reduced this contributes to the formation of dynastic legislature. Rivera et al., (2016) negotiated on bureaucratic performance that state machinery promoting certain politicallegislation for the sake of state interest.

The results further show that dynastic politics had a non significant association with illegal interference of politician during election process leads to seize public mandate (P=0.343), politician coerced

unregistered masses for casting vote (P=0.347) and manipulation of media to announce or publish the wrong results and the wrong candidates as winners before the proper collation of results by the Electoral Commission prevailing (P=0.060). Moreover, the results show that dynastic politics had a non significant association with the authorities involved in promoting fraud (P=0.406), nobody dared to stop unfair election (P=0.095) and bureaucracy involved in favoring election of a specific party government (P=0.661). The results further show that dynastic politics had a non significant association with state didn't try to control candidates from violation during election (P=0.255), the election staff is fraudulent techniques to favor a party (P=0.116) and force is used to poll bogus vote (P=0.073).

From the above results it is concluded that dynasts use electoral fraud as a tool for manipulating of results. Three facts are electoral fraud that promote dynastic politics are more important than other reasons in promotion of dynastic politics. These include bogus polling, destroying opponent votes and use of intimidating tactics at vote

polling stations to repel opponent voters by private or government forces. Winning ofelection in state of affairs will promote dynastic politics.

**Table 4.2**Association between Dynastic Politics and Electoral Fraud

Statements	Attitude	Dynastic Po	Dynastic Politics		Chi square(X <sup>2</sup> )
		Yes	No		P value
Bogus polling is	Yes	83	54	137 69.9%)	X <sup>2</sup> =7.831(P=.025)
common?		(77.6%)	(60.7%)		
	No	19	24	43 (21.9%)	
		(17.8%)	(27.0%)		
	Uncertain	5 (4.7%)	11(12.4%)	16 (8.2%)	
Opposition votes are	Yes	87	56	143(73.0%)	X <sup>2</sup> =8.523(P=.014)
destroyed by using force?		(81.3%)	(62.9%)		
	No	16	28	44 (22.4%)	
		(15.0%)	(31.5%)		
	Uncertain	4 (3.7%)	5 (5.6%)	9 (4.6%)	
Intimidation at the polls using	Yes	89	51	140(71.4%)	X <sup>2</sup> =18.008(P=.000)
private militant gangs orever	n	(83.2%)	(57.3%)		
state security is common?	No	15	24	39 (19.9%)	
		(14.0%)	(27.0%)		
	Uncertain	3 (2.8%)	14	17 (8.7%)	
			(15.7%)		

During election	Yes	72	52	124(63.3%)	X <sup>2</sup> =2.138(P=.343)
Process illegal	168	(67.3%)	(58.4%)	124(03.3%)	A -2.130(f343)
interference of	No	28	27	55 (28.1%)	-
politician leads toseize public		(26.2%)	(30.3%)	33 (26.170)	
mandate?	Uncertain	7 (6.5%)	10	17 (8.7%)	+
indicate.	Oncertain	(0.570)	(11.2%)	17 (8.770)	
Politician coerces	Yes	67	48	115(58.7%)	X <sup>2</sup> =2.114(P=.347)
unregistered masses for		(62.6%)	(53.9%)		
casting vote?	No	23	27	50 (25.5%)	
		(21.5%)	(30.3%)		
	Uncertain	17	14	31 (15.8%)	
		(15.9%)	(15.7%)		
Media manipulation to	Yes	75	56	131(66.8%)	$X^2 = 5.612(P = .060)$
announce or publish the		(70.1%)	(62.9%)		
wrongresults and the wrong		29	23	52 (26.5%)	
candidates as winners before		(27.1%)	(25.8%)		
the proper collation of results	Uncertain	3 (2.8%)	10	13 (6.6%)	
bythe Electoral			(11.2%)		
Commission is					
prevailing?					
The authorities are	Yes	82	61	143(73.0%)	$X^2=1.804(P=.406)$
involved in		(76.6%)	(68.5%)		
Promoting fraud,	No	20	21	41 (20.9%)	
during election?		(18.7%)	(23.6%)		
	Uncertain	5 (4.7%)	7 (7.9%)	12(6.1%)	
Nobody dare to stopunfair	Yes	57	52	109(55.6%)	$X^2=4.715(P=.095)$
election?	/	( <mark>53.3</mark> %)	(58 <mark>.4%)</mark>		
	No	44	26	70 (35.7%)	
		(41.1%)	(29.2%)		
	Uncertain	6 (5.6%)	11	17 (8.7%)	
			(12.4%)		
	Yes	81	65	146(74.5%)	$X^2 = .826(P = .661)$
involved in favoring election		(75.7%)	(73.0%)		
of a specific party	No	19	15	34 (17.3%)	
government?		(17.8%)	(16.9%)		
	Uncertain	7 (6.5%)	9 (10.1%)	16 (8.2%)	2
State doesn't try to control		68	47	115(58.7%)	$X^2=2.734(P=.255)$
candidates from such		(63.6%)	(52.8%)		
violation during election?	No	32	32	64 (32.7%)	
		(29.9%)	(36.0%)		
	Uncertain	7 (6.5%)	10	17 (8.7%	
TIL 1 22	* 7	0.0	(11.2%)	150/56 500	W2 4 201 (5) 44 5
The election staff uses	Yes	88	62	150(76.5%)	X <sup>2</sup> =4.301(P=.116)
fraudulent		(82.2%)	(69.7%)	00 (4 5 00)	_
techniques to favor a party?	No	13	19	32 (16.3%)	
	**	(12.1%)	(21.3%)	14 (7 10()	4
	Uncertain	6 (5.6%)	8 (9.0%)	14 (7.1%)	772 7 220 (D. 072)
Force is used to pollbogus	Yes	85	59	144(73.5%)	$X^2=5.239(P=.073)$
vote?	N.Y.	(79.4%)	(66.3%)	20 (10 00)	4
	No	18	21	39 (19.9%)	
	**	(16.8%)	(23.6%)	40 (5.55)	4
	Uncertain	4 (3.7%)	9 (10.1%)	13 (6.6%)	

\*Values in the table present frequency while values in the parenthesis represent percentages proportion of the respondents

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Politics, in study area is believed that a status of high power with greater potential to influence general masses, this perception of politics makes it a lucrative position to be occupied by people with lust for power. However, acquiring and maintaining a high status political position is quite tricky and demands lots of maneuvering. The politicians to gain power and retain political power are more inclined to inherit their political status to their family members and other kin's in a dynastic fashion. To actualize these desires the masses are kept unaware of political issues and kept indulge in the issues of their daily life to veil the corruption and corrupt practices of the political dynasts. Lack of interest on part of disorganized masses limits the power of political movement to eject political dynasts. Furthermore, the results of election are fraudulently changed or manipulated by bogus polling, destroying opponent votes, use of intimidation to repel opponent voters and established their dynastic rule.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

Following recommendations are made on the basis of study findings.

Awareness raising of general public regarding their responsibilities in selection of political candidate, power of their vote and conscious use of vote as considering their national responsibilities.

Use of mass media in creating political awareness, organizing masses for political issues; like corruption and nepotism and highlighting the menace of dynastic politics among masses.

Bringing reforms in policies and laws related to political parties and election systems that ensure merit based fair election at party, regional and national leveland their implementation later in spirit. Ensuring voter security during election campaign, political rallies in election to encourage fair voting and election of righteous persons at all level.

Strengthening the basic social institutions like family, religion and educational institutions to strengthen moral standards of society and alienate the corrupt components through the boycott.

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