

PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS ABOUT THE TALIBAN GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

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ABSTRACT

This paper explores the public perception of the Taliban's new government in Laghman, Afghanistan, focusing on the legitimacy of their rule and how people view key aspects of governance. Since the Taliban came to power without a formal election, legitimacy is a critical concern, and understanding public perceptions across various domains is essential. The study evaluates five main areas: governance, legal system, economic system, educational system, and peace and security. Data was gathered from educated and well-informed individuals in Laghman through purposive sampling and questionnaires. The results reveal diverse perceptions among the population. The most favorable aspect of the Taliban's rule is their handling of peace and security, with many respondents noting an improvement in safety compared to previous years. However, the educational system is viewed most negatively, with many expressing dissatisfaction over the limitations placed on education, particularly for girls, under the Taliban's regime. The findings highlight the complexities of public opinion in a post-conflict society, where security gains are weighed against challenges in other areas like education and governance. The study underscores the need for the Taliban to address these concerns to gain broader legitimacy, especially in terms of developing inclusive and functional systems in education and law.

INTRODUCTION

This paper attempts to investigate the public perceptions about the economic, political and legal structures and policies. The study primarily focuses the Pashtun dominated Laghman province of Afghanistan to measure how the people perceive the Taliban's government after 2021. The issues of internal legitimacy and consensus on government and political system have always been present in Afghanistan at least since the last hundred years. The Taliban came to power in 2021 through the use of force and driven out the previous democratic government from Kabul and started to rule Afghanistan. This study has a considerable

significance as the group did not come to power through a democratic process of elections but through force. It is thus important to assess how the people see the situation in Afghanistan, the legal, political and economic structures and policies of the Taliban government. The electoral process offers data and results through which we can assess the public's response and their perception about a group or government. The electoral process gives political legitimacy to the government in the eyes of the people. In the case of Afghanistan, we have nothing to assess the public perceptions other than surveys. The study collects data from the well-informed

citizens of Afghanistan regarding the mentioned aspects of the new government.

Although the systematic exclusion of women and girls from many facets of public life limits the benefits that half of the population receives from the positive developments, certain areas of Afghans' lives have improved and others have deteriorated three years after Taliban rule started. At the same time, nothing the Taliban do is likely to overthrow the system, at least not anytime soon, unless they drastically change their stance on women's and girls' rights, which is unlikely. Freedoms of the press and of politics have been significantly decreased. After international soldiers assisted in overthrowing the first Taliban rule in 2001, Kabul saw the emergence of a bare-knuckles party system, with Afghan groups vying for control in rigged elections. Since the new government does not tolerate any kind of opposition, the Taliban's 2021 takeover of the city brought an unsettling silence to the political landscape. The Taliban have effectively established a one-party state by banning political parties, which deters the majority of former politicians who are still in the nation from pursuing their prior careers. The majority of Afghans who oppose the new Islamist authorities have either left, remained silent, or chosen to support the Taliban in spite of their reservations. In public settings, journalists, scholars, and analysts are carefully selecting their words (Graeme Smith, 2024).

Third, unemployment and poverty have significantly increased. Foreign countries abruptly halted all development support in response to the Taliban takeover. Many projects, including those costing over \$2.8 billion in energy, transportation, and irrigation, were put on hold by donors, and very few have been restarted. According to World Bank estimates, the nation's real gross domestic product fell by almost 26% between 2021 and 2022 (World Bank, 2023). In the initial months following the Taliban's return, millions of Afghans fell into poverty, and many of them were on the verge of famine, with 55% of the population experiencing severe hunger. By 2024, just 28% of Afghans were living in the worst types of food insecurity, however the situation remains one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters (World Bank, 2024).

Notwithstanding the struggles that impoverished Afghans endure, the Taliban have contributed to some economic stability. Important metrics have improved, including export volumes, government

revenue, and the value of the Afghani, the country's currency. Following the Taliban's takeover, the value of the Afghani fell against the US dollar, but the new government supported it by, among other things, outlawing transactions using foreign currency. Afghans have decreased access to a number of government services, in part because the state is experiencing financial difficulties as a result of donors ceasing to pay the bills (*Afghanistan Exports*, 2024). The most severely impacted sectors are health, water, and sanitation. Since 2021, hundreds of medical facilities have shuttered, and those that remain are devoid of supplies, equipment, and qualified personnel. Even though the Taliban have made exceptions for female health professionals, the regime's restrictions on women nonetheless contribute to the issue by limiting their ability to work and help other women. Importing goods is also made more difficult by banking problems and sanctions; ordering, paying for, and obtaining necessities has become more difficult. As a result, avoidable illnesses have increased, particularly among youngsters. Water systems have also deteriorated due to a shortage of supplies and upkeep, particularly in metropolitan areas, increasing the percentage of homes without adequate access to water from 48% in 2021 to 67% in 2023. Travel-related documents, such as marriage and birth certificates and particularly passports, have been hampered by bureaucratic red tape (ILO, 2023).

Twenty years of conflict came to an end with the exit of the United States and NATO, and peace and security have been the primary improvements since the Taliban assumed power. Tens of thousands of Afghans died annually during the war's last phases, making it the deadliest conflict in the world for a few years. People escaped in their millions. Following the Taliban's triumph, the pandemonium subsided as the erstwhile rebels took over more area than any government had in decades. Although there is still anti-Taliban opposition in isolated places, particularly from the South Asian branch of Islamic State and surviving security personnel, the frequency of battles has been gradually decreasing (UCDP, 2024). Because it is impossible to determine the amount of risk presented by Islamic State, al-Qaeda, and other groups that may be present in Afghanistan, it is more difficult to assess transnational jihadist threats coming from that country. However, it is evident that Taliban intelligence keeps an eye on these organizations, and the government has brutally

suppressed Islamic State. The Taliban have taken a more subtle approach to dealing with other terrorists, concentrating on moving insurgents away from delicate boundaries. The Taliban maintain open lines of communication with their Western counterparts; many European and American security officials view the Taliban as a bulwark against Islamic State, which they regard to be the primary threat. Though with little success, regional nations that are battling militants who take refuge in Afghanistan, such as China, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Pakistan, have also worked with the Taliban to resolve their security issues (Crisis Group, 2022).

In contrast to the previous administration, which tended to overlook the needs of the rural population, the Taliban view rural Afghans as an important component of their base of support and promote international assistance for these underserved areas. Additionally, access to rural regions has improved for humanitarian and other purposes. Millions of people in the pro-government and anti-government forces' zones, which were sometimes inaccessible to humanitarian organizations, were created as a result of the war. In contrast to the previous administration, which tended to overlook the needs of the rural population, the Taliban view rural Afghans as an important component of their base of support and promote international assistance for these underserved areas. Although access issues still exist and the terrain in Afghanistan can be challenging at times, seasoned aid workers report that their reach into the most remote areas of the nation is larger than it has ever been in recent decades. (OCHA, 2024).

Relative security has aided the new government in fixing parts of the nation's deteriorating infrastructure, especially the water and transportation systems. They have resumed initiatives, including several that were underway when funders stopped funding them, despite severe financial limitations. The Qush Tepa canal, which is intended to irrigate 550,000 hectares of agriculture, was built on the northern border after authorities finished building a number of dams. A road connecting Afghanistan with China and the Salang tunnel connecting Kabul with the country's north are two examples of the transportation networks that the Taliban are constructing or repairing. The Taliban, meantime, have mostly eradicated the corruption that the old administration supported by the United States was known for. Between 2001 and 2021, corrupt officials embezzled billions of dollars in foreign aid. The

Taliban implemented stringent anti-corruption measures while keeping most of the old bureaucracy. The centralization of the governmental machinery and decreased corruption have contributed to the simplification of several state tasks, including tax collection (TOLO, 2024). Furthermore, the regime's housekeeping at checkpoints and customs is estimated to have eliminated bribes totaling almost \$1.4 billion. Though nothing like what happened in the past, business owners have started to voice their displeasure about the resurgence of unethical activities (Xcept, 2024).

The growth in elementary school attendance for both boys and girls is an unexpected last good indication that few outsiders have noticed. The Taliban's restriction of girls attending public secondary schools and colleges has drawn international criticism, and with good reason. The statistics, however, indicate that primary school is a different matter, particularly for females. A World Bank poll found that 60 percent of females between the ages of seven and twelve were enrolled in elementary education in 2023, compared to 36 percent before to the Taliban rule. Some families believe Taliban-run schools are more acceptable in terms of religion or culture than those of the previous system, and the surge seems to be a result of the conclusion of the conflict. Additionally, more boys are now able to attend school, and the gender gap is closing. The lack of schools, particularly in rural regions, is the main barrier preventing further progress at the primary level. (*Afghanistan-Welfare-Monitoring-Survey-3.Pdf*, 2024). This study is thus important to examine how do the people view and perceive the government of Taliban after 2021.

Methodology

The article focuses main areas such as their economic policies, legal system, political affairs and political system, educational policies and the peace and security situation in Afghanistan. The study is quantitative in nature. The primary data is collected through purposive sampling from about 60 respondents in the province of Laghman. The 60 respondents are selected according to the ratio of literacy in the province. The purposive sampling is selected because the study was to gather information from those who could understand or were aware of the legal, political, social and economic affairs of Afghanistan. These were the people who could give their opinions regarding the mentioned sectors of the

Taliban government. The study is organized as the next section provides a summary of the existing literature on the Taliban government and recent relevant studies regarding the people's perception in Afghanistan about the Taliban. The next section is based on the data collected from the people. It provides quantitative measures and tables and graphs to understand how do the people perceive the Taliban government. The data is analysed according to the themes provided in the questionnaire such as legal system, educational policies, economic policies, political systems and security situation.

Existing literature

The existing literature on the area touches some of the aspects about how do the people of Afghanistan perceive the government of Taliban. Latif et al. (2022) conducted a study using thematic analysis to explore how audiences perceived the United States' retreat from Afghanistan, a topic that had garnered limited attention in the past year. This study sought to understand public reactions to the U.S. withdrawal, particularly in the context of the Taliban's rapid takeover of the country. Latif et al. (2022) developed a research question that centered around understanding the audience's perception of the Taliban's resurgence. Their investigation was aimed at addressing the gap in research surrounding how global audiences, especially those outside Afghanistan, interpreted and responded to the political and military events that unfolded during and after the U.S. retreat. By using thematic analysis, the researchers were able to identify patterns in the ways people understood the implications of the U.S. withdrawal and the subsequent Taliban takeover, shedding light on the broader public sentiment regarding these events.

On the other hand, Dastgeer (2020) focused more specifically on the perspectives of the Afghan people, particularly their views on the peace process between the U.S. and the Taliban. Her study explored how Afghans viewed the Doha Peace Agreement of 2020, a pivotal accord aimed at ending the war and facilitating a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. The study delved into the nuances of Afghan public opinion, especially regarding the legitimacy of the Taliban and the peace talks. Dastgeer (2020) found that the Afghan public was divided in its perception of the agreement. Many Afghans questioned the sincerity of the Taliban's commitment to peace, while others feared the return of the Taliban to power

would lead to a loss of the democratic gains made over the past two decades. The study provided critical insight into how the peace process was viewed by those most directly affected by the conflict, offering a stark contrast to the perspectives of international audiences.

Ahmadi and Hikmat (2023) adopted a quantitative approach to gauge public attitudes toward the situation in Afghanistan in 2023, two years after the U.S. withdrawal. Their study used a descriptive analytical method and surveyed a range of participants, including social media activists, students, and university professors, to assess how different demographic groups perceived the evolving situation in Afghanistan. The study aimed to capture the diverse perspectives of educated and politically engaged segments of Afghan society, offering a contemporary snapshot of how public sentiment had shifted since the Taliban's return to power. Ahmadi and Hikmat (2023) used questionnaires as their primary data collection tool, enabling them to quantify public attitudes and analyze trends over time. Their findings contributed valuable data on how the public, particularly those involved in academia and social activism, viewed the Taliban's rule, as well as their hopes for the future of Afghanistan under this new regime. These studies provide a comprehensive look at public perceptions of the Taliban's takeover and the broader implications of the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan. While Latif et al. (2022) explored global audiences' perceptions, Dastgeer (2020) focused on the Afghan public's response to the peace process, and Ahmadi & Hikmat (2023) captured more recent attitudes within Afghan society. Each study contributes important perspectives that highlight the complex and multifaceted nature of public opinion regarding Afghanistan's future.

Public Perceptions about the Taliban government Governance

This section of the paper focuses on the responses gathered from respondents in Laghman province of Afghanistan to the question, "How satisfied are you with the governance of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan?" The results, illustrated in Figure 01, show a clear indication of general approval toward the current governance system. According to the data, 44.4% of the respondents expressed that they are satisfied with the governance, while another 44.4% indicated that they are strongly satisfied. A

smaller proportion, 11.1%, reported that they are not satisfied with the governance under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.

The data reveals a positive sentiment towards the governing body in Laghman province, with a combined 88.8% of the respondents either satisfied or strongly satisfied. This suggests that a significant majority of the population feels content with the way the province is being governed, underlining a sense of approval or at least tolerance of the governance model imposed by the Islamic Emirate. The respondents who are satisfied may perceive improvements in governance, security, or public services, although these factors would require further analysis to fully understand the reasons behind the positive responses.

However, the 11.1% of respondents who expressed dissatisfaction with the governance represent a notable minority. While this percentage is relatively small compared to the satisfied group, it still

indicates that there are concerns or grievances within a portion of the population. The reasons for dissatisfaction might include issues such as a lack of political freedoms, economic hardships, or other governance challenges, but these would need to be explored in more detail in subsequent sections of the research. The responses suggest a generally favorable view of the Islamic Emirate's governance in Laghman province, reflecting a level of acceptance, if not active support, among the majority of the population. However, the dissatisfaction expressed by the smaller group highlights the complexity of the situation, as different segments of the population may have divergent views based on their individual experiences or expectations from the government. This split in satisfaction levels may point to underlying issues that could affect the long-term stability of the governance system in Afghanistan.

Figure 1: Governance

		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Satisfied	44.4	44.4	44.4
	Fully Satisfied	44.4	44.4	88.9
	Completely Dissatisfied	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	

In another question, they were asked, "How good do you think the government of the Taliban is?" As illustrated in Figure 02, the survey reveals a range of opinions regarding the perceived effectiveness of the Taliban's governance. A majority of respondents, 55.56%, believe that the Taliban government is "75% good," suggesting that they see some positive aspects in its rule, but with certain reservations. In contrast, 33.33% of respondents considered the government "bad," rating it only 25% good. Lastly, 11.11% of those surveyed expressed an exceptionally favorable view, stating that the Taliban government is "100% good" for the people of Afghanistan.

The majority response—55.56%—indicates that more than half of the respondents see the Taliban government in a relatively positive light, with a rating of 75% good. This could imply that while the respondents acknowledge some positive aspects of the governance, such as improvements in security or

social order, they may still have reservations about other areas such as economic conditions, political freedoms, or human rights. The perception that the Taliban government is "75% good" suggests a pragmatic view, where people may be recognizing some successes or stability brought by the Taliban, but are also critical of its shortcomings or its more restrictive policies.

On the other hand, 33.33% of respondents view the Taliban government negatively, rating it only 25% good. This significant portion of the population expresses dissatisfaction, possibly due to concerns about the regime's harsh policies, lack of political inclusivity, restrictions on women's rights, and the overall governance style. For these respondents, the Taliban's rule might seem more harmful than beneficial, despite any improvements in security or governance efficiency.

The smallest group, 11.11%, sees the Taliban government as "100% good," reflecting an idealized view of their rule. These individuals likely see the Taliban's governance as completely aligned with their values, possibly viewing the return of the group to power as a positive step towards restoring Islamic law and order in the country. This group might prioritize ideological or religious factors over other political or social concerns.

the responses demonstrate a mixed evaluation of the Taliban's government. While most respondents hold a somewhat positive view, there is a substantial minority that is either critical or highly critical of their rule. This division in opinion reflects the complexities and challenges of governance in Afghanistan under the Taliban and highlights the varying perspectives within the population.




Figure 2 How good the Taliban government is?

Legal System and the people’s perceptions

In response to the question, "How satisfied are you with the Islamic Emirate's justice system?" the majority of respondents expressed a positive view of the system's performance. As shown in Figure 03, 66.66% of those surveyed stated that they were "satisfied" with the justice system under the Islamic Emirate, while a further 33.33% reported that they were "fully satisfied." This indicates that a substantial 100% of respondents, collectively, expressed some level of satisfaction with the justice system, whether it was partial or complete. The high levels of satisfaction suggest that many people in the surveyed area believe the Islamic Emirate’s justice

system has been effective in fulfilling its intended role. This could reflect perceptions of fairness, improved security, or the implementation of laws in line with Islamic principles. However, it is important to note that the responses do not differentiate between specific aspects of the justice system, such as legal procedures or the execution of punishments, so the reasons behind the satisfaction remain unclear without further investigation.

Despite the positive feedback, it is worth considering that the satisfaction rate might not reflect the opinions of all sectors of society, and some individuals may have reservations that are not captured by these general responses.

Figure 3 Legal System

	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid Satisfied	66.7	66.7	66.7
Fully Satisfied	33.3	33.3	100.0
Total	100.0	100.0	

In response another question, "How good do you think the justice system of the Islamic Emirate is?" the answers collected from respondents in Laghman province reveal a range of opinions regarding the effectiveness of the Taliban's legal system. As shown in Figure 04, 22.22% of respondents believe that the justice system is "100% good," suggesting that this group views the legal framework as entirely effective and in alignment with their expectations, likely due to its focus on Islamic law. Another 22.22% rated the justice system as "50% good," indicating a more mixed opinion, where respondents may see some positive aspects but also significant shortcomings or areas that need improvement.

The largest group, 55.56%, considered the justice system to be "75% good," implying that while they

generally approve of the system, they have reservations about certain aspects. This could reflect concerns over issues such as fairness, the implementation of certain laws, or the overall accessibility of the system for different groups in society. The responses suggest a more nuanced view of the Taliban's legal framework, where many respondents may recognize its effectiveness in some areas but acknowledge room for improvement in others. , these results highlight a generally positive, yet mixed perception of the Taliban's justice system, with significant variation in how respondents view its effectiveness.




Figure 4 How good is the legal system of the Taliban?

Economic System: Public Perceptions

When respondents were asked, "How satisfied are you with the economic system of the Islamic Emirate?" the answers revealed a mix of positive and negative views. As shown in the data, 55.6% of respondents expressed that they were "satisfied" with the economic system under the Islamic Emirate, indicating a majority of the population sees some level of effectiveness in the current economic policies. These respondents may view improvements in areas such as economic stability, job opportunities, or the availability of basic goods and services as reasons for their satisfaction. Additionally, 22.2% of respondents reported that they were "fully satisfied," suggesting that a smaller segment of the population believes the economic system is performing

exceptionally well. These individuals may have experienced direct benefits from the Taliban's economic management, perhaps through better control of inflation, improved public services, or greater security for businesses and markets.

However, an equal 22.2% of respondents said they were "not satisfied" with the economic system, pointing to a significant portion of the population that feels dissatisfied or critical of the Taliban's economic policies. This group may be facing economic hardships, such as rising unemployment, inflation, or restrictions on international trade, which could contribute to their discontent. Overall, the responses reflect a mixed opinion on the economic system under the Taliban, with both satisfaction and dissatisfaction coexisting.

Figure 5 Economic System

		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Satisfied	55.6	55.6	55.6
	Fully Satisfied	22.2	22.2	77.8
	Not Satisfied	22.2	22.2	100.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	

We asked respondents to evaluate the effectiveness of the Islamic Emirate’s economic system and policies. The responses were varied, as shown in the figure 06, indicating a mix of positive and critical views on the current economic situation. The results showed that 22.2% of respondents rated the economic policies as 100% good, suggesting a strong endorsement of the Islamic Emirate’s approach to economic governance. These respondents likely see the policies as entirely beneficial, possibly due to their alignment with ideological or religious values that emphasize self-sufficiency, social justice, or other principles central to the Islamic Emirate's economic vision. This group may also believe that the system effectively addresses key economic challenges, such as poverty alleviation, and fosters stability within the country.

However, a smaller portion of respondents, 11.11%, rated the economic system as only 25% good, indicating a predominantly negative assessment. This group may view the economic policies as largely ineffective or failing to meet expectations. Possible reasons for this negative outlook could include concerns over persistent issues like unemployment, inflation, and the lack of foreign investment, compounded by the effects of international sanctions and limited global recognition. These factors could undermine the effectiveness of the economic policies, especially in

a country with a fragile infrastructure and a significant dependence on international aid and trade.

The majority of respondents, 44.44%, gave the economic policies a score of 50% good, reflecting a more moderate and balanced perspective. This group likely recognizes some positive aspects of the Islamic Emirate’s economic approach, such as efforts to restore order, promote local industries, or regulate certain sectors. However, they also acknowledge the significant challenges facing the system, including limited access to global markets, financial isolation, and the hurdles posed by a weakened economy. These respondents may see the Islamic Emirate’s economic policies as a work in progress, with room for improvement and refinement.

Finally, 22.22% of respondents rated the economic system as 75% good, indicating a relatively positive view, though not without reservations. This group likely sees notable successes in the implementation of economic policies but may still be cautious about the long-term sustainability and the broader impact of the policies. They might view recent efforts to stabilize the economy and ensure local production as positive, while recognizing that external factors—such as political instability, regional tensions, and economic isolation—remain significant obstacles.




Figure 6 How good is the economic system?

Educational System and Policies

We asked respondents about their satisfaction with the Islamic Emirate's education system in Afghanistan. The results revealed a significant level of dissatisfaction, as shown in the figure 07, with only a small percentage of respondents expressing contentment with the current state of education. Specifically, 22.2% of respondents reported being "fully satisfied," indicating that a portion of the population believes the education system is meeting their expectations. These individuals may appreciate certain aspects of the current education policies, such as efforts to restore order, maintain Islamic values within the curriculum, or promote education in rural areas. They may also see the government's actions as a positive step toward addressing educational gaps, particularly after decades of conflict and instability. On the other hand, a more significant portion of respondents, 11.1%, stated that they were "satisfied" with the education system, though not fully. This group may recognize some improvements or positive changes, but still believe there are critical areas that need attention. For example, while some educational institutions may be functioning and providing basic education, many respondents likely feel that the quality of education, access to resources, and opportunities for higher learning remain insufficient. Additionally, this group may also be concerned about the limitations imposed on girls' education, especially in the higher education sector, which has

become a major point of contention and criticism both within Afghanistan and internationally.

The largest portion of respondents, 66.7%, expressed that they were "not satisfied" with the education system under the Islamic Emirate. This indicates widespread dissatisfaction with how the education system is currently being managed. There are several possible reasons for this dissatisfaction. A major issue is the restrictions placed on girls' education, with many girls unable to attend secondary school or university due to the policies enforced by the Islamic Emirate. Furthermore, challenges such as overcrowded classrooms, inadequate facilities, lack of qualified teachers, and limited access to modern learning materials likely contribute to the discontent. The lack of international aid and resources, as well as Afghanistan's political and economic isolation, may also hinder efforts to rebuild and improve the education system. While a small portion of respondents are satisfied or fully satisfied with the Islamic Emirate's education system, the overwhelming majority—66.7%—are not satisfied, pointing to significant concerns regarding the quality, accessibility, and inclusivity of education in Afghanistan. These results suggest that much work remains to be done to address the widespread dissatisfaction and to ensure that all segments of Afghan society, especially women and girls, have equal access to quality education.

Figure 7 Educational System

		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Satisfied	11.1	11.1	11.1
	Fully Satisfied	22.2	22.2	33.3
	Not Satisfied	66.7	66.7	100.0
Total		100.0	100.0	

In a follow-up question to our respondents, we asked for their views on how good they think the Islamic Emirate’s educational system and policies are in Afghanistan. The results showed a range of opinions, reflecting a mix of support and criticism regarding the current state of education in the country.

A small percentage of respondents, shown in figure 08, 11.1%, rated the educational system as 100% good, suggesting that they believe the Islamic Emirate’s policies are entirely effective. This group may view the system positively, perhaps due to its alignment with their values or specific reforms they see as beneficial, such as attempts to restore discipline or focus on religious education. However, it’s important to note that this group represents a minority view, indicating that the system is not universally praised.

Another 11.1% of respondents rated the system as 75% good, suggesting a relatively positive but cautious assessment. These individuals might acknowledge some improvements or positive aspects of the Islamic Emirate’s education policies but likely

recognize that there are still significant challenges or areas for improvement. They may be optimistic about the direction of educational reforms but remain aware of the limitations.

The majority of respondents, 33.3%, rated the educational system as only 25% good, reflecting a largely negative view. This indicates widespread dissatisfaction, likely due to restrictions on girls’ education, the lack of resources, and challenges related to quality and access. Many in this group might feel that the education system is failing to meet the needs of all Afghan children, especially women and girls.

Finally, 44.4% of respondents rated the system as 50% good, signaling a more balanced view. These respondents likely recognize some positive efforts but also acknowledge significant shortcomings. Overall, the survey results suggest that while some see merit in the Islamic Emirate’s educational policies, many others feel the system needs substantial improvement.




Figure 8 How good is the educational system of Taliban?

Peace and Security

To assess the public’s satisfaction with the peace and security situation under the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, respondents were asked to rate their level of satisfaction. The results indicated a divided view, with a majority of respondents expressing satisfaction but a notable minority feeling dissatisfied.

A substantial 55.6% of respondents reported, shown in the *figure 09*, being "Fully Satisfied" with the current security situation. This suggests that over half of the people surveyed feel that the Taliban's governance has, at least in their view, brought stability and security to their daily lives. It is important to consider that for many, security may be interpreted primarily in terms of reduced violence and the absence of active conflict, which may have been more common in the years leading up to the Taliban's return to power in August 2021. Additionally, 33.3% of respondents stated they were "Satisfied," though not fully. This group may acknowledge improvements in security but could

also have reservations or concerns about certain aspects of governance or specific security issues. The partial satisfaction could reflect issues such as concerns over restrictions on personal freedoms, economic instability, or localized security challenges, which may not be fully addressed despite an overall reduction in large-scale conflict.

On the other hand, 11.1% of respondents reported being "Completely Dissatisfied" with the security situation. This minority likely feels that the security under the Islamic Emirate has not met their expectations, possibly due to persisting instability, human rights violations, or a lack of certain freedoms under the new regime. The results reveals that while the majority of people express satisfaction with peace and security under the Islamic Emirate, there remain significant concerns among a portion of the population, highlighting the complexity of the political and security situation in Afghanistan.

Figure 9 Peace and Security

		Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Satisfied	33.3	33.3	33.3
	Fully Satisfied	55.6	55.6	88.9
	Completely Dissatisfied	11.1	11.1	100.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	

In another question, we asked respondents to evaluate the peace and security situation in Afghanistan, seeking their opinions on how good the current conditions are. The responses showed a generally positive view, but with varying degrees of satisfaction among the participants.

A small minority, shown in the *figure 10*, 11.1%, felt that the peace and security situation in Afghanistan was only "25% good." This indicates a level of dissatisfaction, with these respondents likely believing that while some improvements have been made, the security situation remains problematic. For this group, the reduction in large-scale violence might not be enough to outweigh ongoing challenges such as economic instability, human rights concerns, or sporadic security threats. They may feel that the overall situation is still far from ideal.

On the other hand, a significant portion of respondents, 44.44%, stated that the situation is "75% good." This suggests that nearly half of the

respondents acknowledge noticeable improvements in peace and security under the current regime, though they also believe there are areas that still require attention. These individuals might appreciate the relative reduction in major conflicts or violence but still perceive issues like local unrest, limited freedoms, or gaps in law enforcement and justice systems as ongoing concerns.

The largest group, another 44.44%, agreed that the peace and security situation is "100% good." This group represents those who are fully satisfied with the security conditions under the current government. They likely view the current situation as stable and peaceful, with no significant threats to their daily lives. Their opinion may reflect a perception of the end of the prolonged conflict that plagued Afghanistan in recent years, leading them to feel a sense of security and calm.




Figure 10 How good is the situation of peace in Afghanistan?

Conclusion

In 2021, the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, overthrowing the previous government and dismantling its political system. This shift marked a significant change in the country's governance, affecting various aspects of life, including the economy, legal framework, education, and security. In order to understand how the people of Laghman perceive the Taliban's rule, a comprehensive survey was conducted, focusing on several key areas: governance, the economic system, the legal system, the educational system, and peace and security.

The results of the survey reveal a generally positive outlook on the Taliban's governance in Laghman, with 88.8% of respondents either "satisfied" or "fully satisfied" with the current state of governance. This indicates that most people in the region feel that the Taliban's administration is performing well in managing government affairs, perhaps due to improved stability or the elimination of widespread conflict that characterized the previous years. These respondents likely view the Taliban's rule as bringing a sense of order and control, which is particularly significant in a region that has faced significant unrest in the past.

Regarding the legal system, the survey results are even more striking, with 100% of respondents expressing satisfaction. This overwhelming approval could reflect the perception that the Taliban's legal system, which is based on a strict interpretation of Islamic law, has provided a sense of justice and

fairness, particularly in a country where legal institutions have been weak and corrupt in the past. However, it is important to note that the legal system's effectiveness may be viewed differently by various groups, particularly those whose rights or freedoms might be restricted under the new system. When it comes to the economic system, 77.8% of respondents were either satisfied or fully satisfied. This result suggests that while there has been some positive change in economic conditions, challenges remain. The Taliban's economic policies, including attempts to stabilize the economy, address unemployment, and manage resources, seem to have had a somewhat positive effect, though the economic situation may still be difficult for many, particularly in terms of access to international aid and opportunities for growth.

However, the results show a stark contrast when it comes to the educational system. A significant 88.9% of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the current state of education under the Taliban. This dissatisfaction likely stems from the Taliban's restrictions on girls' education, with many secondary and university schools being closed to female students. The perception of this policy as a major setback for education and gender equality is reflected in the survey data, where education appears to be a significant area of concern for the people of Laghman. Lastly, the peace and security situation under the Taliban's rule also received a generally favorable response, with 88.9% of respondents either

satisfied or fully satisfied. This finding aligns with the overall perception that the end of large-scale conflict and the Taliban's consolidation of power have brought a sense of relative peace and security to the region.

In summary, results show a mixed but predominantly positive assessment of the Taliban's government in Laghman. While there is significant satisfaction with governance, legal systems, and peace and security, the educational system stands out as a major point of dissatisfaction. The contrast between the positive outlook on governance and the negative response to education highlights ongoing tensions and challenges in the Taliban's policies, particularly regarding the rights of women and girls.

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