

## DEBT TRAP OR ECONOMIC AID: THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF IMF BAILOUTS ON PAKISTAN'S DEVELOPMENT AND THE ROLE OF CHINA

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Received: 05 April, 2024

Revised: 05 May, 2024

Accepted: 22 May, 2024

Published: 05 June, 2024

### ABSTRACT

Grand strategy outlines a state's ultimate goals and what it hopes to accomplish throughout a struggle. When they show discernible effects on state policy, their ramifications are long-lasting. As a result, China has emerged in the new century as a major regional and eventually international force. After switching to a new development mode, China decided on its goals and set out to achieve them, with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region. These goals are to modernize China, raise the country's per capita GDP to that of industrialized nations, and establish a prosperous society. China has a window of strategic opportunity that extends until 2020 and beyond, according to Xi Jinping, who revealed the country's grand strategy in 2013. The purpose of this essay is to analyze China's Asia-Pacific Grand Strategy. By examining its objectives and areas of interest, it first defines the Chinese strategy. Second, it breaks it down and looks at how China uses its power—economic, political, diplomatic, and security—to protect its interests and maintain peace in the area. Additionally, it examines Chinese foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region in comparison to the global social institutions described in Bull's theories.

**Keywords:** Grand strategy, China's Asia-Pacific, Bull's theory, Pakistan, IMF

### INTRODUCTION

Surprisingly, despite the phrase "Grand Strategy" having been around for a while, no author has really given it significance (Silove, 2018). There aren't many definitions of grand strategy, but the ones that exist are distinct and capture different facets of the idea. Grand strategy and the term "strategy" as used in international relations have similar meanings, but they are not the same. Grand strategy includes the state's aims, goals, and policies as well as its diplomatic, military, economic, and strategic approaches to engagement and response to opportunities and challenges in the international system, including interactions with non-state actors and other states. In a broader sense, grand strategy is long-term planning related to state policies and interests that need to span decades rather than just years (Lissner, 2018). The case study also demonstrated that legislators should be mindful of the state's aims and objectives in order to safeguard the state's interests and allocate resources accordingly. Rather than developing policies on a

daily or case-by-case basis, they do so with the achievement of long-term objectives in mind.

One important aspect of grand strategy is that, even if it may not officially be called such on paper, it may still be decided by state leaders. They intentionally implement some policies that align with the dynamics of state relations. Regardless of whether the state has formally adopted a Grand Strategy or not, all of its leaders have a goal in mind, and it employs specific strategies to safeguard its interests while avoiding confrontation with other governments. Regardless of their ignorance of the reality, some thinkers like Edward Luttwak argued that every state had a grand plan. William Martel further suggests that each state should have a Grand Strategy with objectives, resources, and guidelines for execution. As a result, this essay aims to examine China's Grand Strategy by focusing on goals and interests while taking into account the problematic region. It talks about how China is securing the protection of its interests in the Asia-Pacific area and

establishing political power via the use of diplomatic, economic, political, and security tools. Hadley Bull's definition of institutions serves as the basis for this analysis's formulation.

### **The Grand Strategy of China**

When examining the Chinese Grand Strategy, the first thing to grasp is that the country's objectives and interests must be determined. State interests continue to be a part of policies, and objectives are the outcomes that the state hopes to attain. Grand strategy, however, is not a list of every state's interests or goals since there are many of them. Instead, the leaders choose the most crucial ones and create policies to achieve them. The Chinese leadership has made clear what its policies are and when they will be implemented. For instance, the CPC states that the ultimate aim of the Chinese party is the implementation of communism (Yongnian & Gore, 2019) They also believe that China is now and will only be in the first stages of socialism for a little while longer.

China is a regional and global force that has been recognized since the turn of the twenty-first century. Since the start of the new era of growth, China has set goals and is committed to achieving them between 2021 and 2024. These are the goals of modernizing China, raising per capita income to that of industrialized nations, and making the country a more developed society. China's Grand Strategy was announced by CPC General Secretary Xi Jinping in 2013 (Johnson, 2016). According to him, the period from now until 2020 (or beyond) is suitably referred to as China's "strategic window." One might conclude that stability and internal development are necessary for China to attain its long-term objectives. In addition to strong political ties via diplomacy and security cooperation, China needs to have excellent neighbors and very cordial economic connections with all of the South East Asian countries. In summary, it is advised that China should be friendlier and more cautious with its neighboring or regional nations. But according to Xi Jinping, China's policy of good neighborliness does not mean that its territorial integrity, sovereignty, or interests as a country would be jeopardized. It is an unchangeable, uncompromising central policy that will never be subject to negotiation in China. China's strategy toward the Asia-Pacific area is clear: rather than confronting its neighbors, China will expand its economy and military to such an extent in the coming

years that it will force them to retaliate by preserving cordial relations and supporting China's interests in the area.

### **Principal Goals**

Based on an assessment of the present stage of the Belt and Road Initiative, a number of key goals may be defined within the framework of China's grand plan (Jones & Zeng 2020)

China views a number of objectives as both long- and short-term components of its Grand Strategy. In the Asia-Pacific area, the main objectives of China's GS include controlling the near seas, preserving Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, and integrating economically. China's top priority is to keep the Asia-Pacific area's superpower, the United States, at bay while safeguarding its own interests and preventing hostilities in favor of amicable relations.

### **Integration of Regional Economy**

During a tour to Southeast Asian nations in October 2013, Chinese leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang made their first official endorsements of the new Maritime Silk Road. Thus, it is clear from this specific action that the People's Republic of China intends to preserve ASER strategically. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) unites the Pacific and Indian Oceans, creating a free-trade zone beside the Chinese borders (Mobley, 2019) As the effort for regional economic and trade cooperation, BRI was formally announced by China. Furthermore, China insisted that a new framework be established for the financial growth of the area that would support multilateral regional infrastructure development under its leadership. In addition to the Belt and Road Initiative and other economic initiatives focused on infrastructure development, China made a hundred million U.S. S. the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) was established using dollars. Additionally, China established the \$40 billion Silk Road Fund to finance regional projects. In addition to all of this, China gave the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) countries development funding. The \$100 billion in material resources belongs to the BRICS Development Bank.

As a means of integrating with the rest of the area, China has made substantial investments in infrastructure here. One example is the Nanning Singapore Economic Corridor, which connects China with Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore by standard roads and

railways. Six nations in the Mekong River Basin now have connection thanks to the Mekong Project, which connected China's Yunnan province. China often welcomes exports into the area as part of its trade and economic policies. Ten countries—ASEAN, Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, and India—signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) (Armstrong & Drysdale, 2022). In February 2020, fifteen nations in the Asia-Pacific area had joined the GMS, which started with six in 1992. China used to see the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) as a means of combining all of the trade accords for the ASEAN countries and its dialogue partner into one.

In addition to the bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) between China and South Korea, there are also growing trilateral FTAs involving China, Japan, and South Korea. China aims to support regional governments in their economic development while also ensuring that its interests in the area are not jeopardized. This is achieved via its strategy of economic development and participation in regional forums headed by China. Put differently, China has adopted a strategic model of using rewards and penalties to achieve its objectives. China's approach proved to be successful from the late 1990s to the beginning of the 2000s. China prioritized commercial relations with neighboring nations while neglecting political competition and conflict between the states in favor of geopolitical security with core interests.

#### **In command of the Near Seas:**

China is becoming a global powerhouse not only in the military but also in the economy. The goal of military upgrading is to deter other powers—especially the United States—from intruding on China's near-shore areas. Because of this, the Chinese navy's policy has gradually changed to concentrate on enhancing its ability to intervene or on developing its regional operating capabilities. Its purpose is to keep other nations from interfering with the seas around the Yellow Sea, South China Sea, and East China Sea. China has developed Anti-Access/Area-Denial (A2/AD) weaponry to complement its counter-intervention strategy. These weapons include integrated air defense systems, sophisticated fighter aircraft, air refueling capabilities, short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and cruise

missiles deployed from both the ground and the air. China may utilize any of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands, which are at the center of the China-Japan conflict, anywhere in the area, including Taiwan. However, its primary strategic purpose will be to deter or prevent US engagement in the Taiwan Straits issue.

#### **The Sovereignty Claim of China**

China has considered achieving sovereignty and territorial integrity to be one of the primary goals of its international and internal policy ever since dynasties came to power. More than ever, the People's Republic of China is actively attempting to annex and extend its territory in the East and South China Seas. Japan has a similar claim, while China defines the Senkaku/Diaoyu as an intrinsic part of its territory. For the first time, China sailed ships up to 12 nautical miles surrounding the islands in 2008, despite the aforementioned assertions. When Japan submitted a proposal to purchase these islands in 2012, China seized the chance to start establishing procedures in both the territorial sea and the infectious region. China aimed to increase its power in the area in order to assert its dominance over the seized territories and oppose Japanese rule. First, as a measure of coercion against Japan, China established an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea in 2013 (Muralidharan, 2013) As a result, China was forced to legally acknowledge the area as a part of the territorial dispute between China and Japan. This occurred as a result of Japan's relative decline in strength and China's growing influence.

Conversely, in the South China Sea, there was a verbal agreement between China and the Philippines that was purportedly disrupted by China. It seized control of Shoal and put limitations on long-distance fishermen's access there. They pledged to uphold the following values earlier in 2012: ceasing hostilities and removing their ships from Scarborough. China also established military and administrative districts in the disputed area by Vietnam and other claims, as well as hydrocarbon blocks surrounding its claimed territories and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within 200 nm. Regarding the South China Sea, it is evident that China is prepared to go to considerable measures in order to safeguard its interests there. China exercises creeping authority in the ECS and SCS and does not want foreign intervention to undermine its sovereignty over those regions.

Periodically, China uses its economy as leverage. For instance, in 2010, when Japan jailed the captain of a Chinese fishing boat, China acted as a sourner and stopped exporting rare earth materials to Japan. Similar to that, China used the embargo on fruit imports from Manila to compel the Philippines to withdraw from Scarborough Shoal. China's stronger economic and military might in the twenty-first century have allowed it to maintain its political goals while establishing its domination over the area.

#### **China's Grand Strategy is at risk from:**

Therefore, it is essential to identify both external and internal risks and possibilities to China and its further development as a global power in order to fully understand the concept of China's Grand Strategy. Any nation's approach for advancing its national interests in international interactions is outlined in its foreign policy. Therefore, Chinese academics assert that there is a growing threat to China's Grand Strategy on a national and worldwide scale. (Wang, 2016)

#### **Domestic Dangers:**

Actually, foreign policy specialists tend to pay more attention to China's external concerns than its internal problems most of the time. In this instance, Chinese specialists focus a great deal of their emphasis on foreign policy analysis, often neglecting internal issues (Lanteigne, 2019) The domestic problems are a phenomenon that cannot be countered when observing the present or the future of any strategy in China, so it is important to address them when differentiating between Chinese and foreign analysts when observing events like China's rise or its Grand Strategy. Chinese thinker Zheng Bijian identified the three main challenges facing China's growth as the lack of local resources, environmental constraints, and the mismatch between the country's economic and social advancement (Zheng, 2006)

Wen Jiabao, a former premier of the People's Republic of China, has referred to China's economic progress as "decoupled, fake, and toxic," suggesting that it is unsteady and unsustainable. The "unbalanced" is the most difficult because of China's economy's remarkable pace of growth, which causes a gap in wealth and/or advantages between the "haves" and the "have-nots." (Anagnost, 2013) The proletariat, or low-income earners, are enraged, and as a consequence, a number of things happen that cause social unrest. Chinese leaders are concerned

about these situations and devise plans to handle them since they have the potential to cause political unrest. This is due to the fact that an unstable society would have an impact on China's foreign policy, or what is known as the Grand Strategy. Other internal challenges to China's grand plan include under-provision, unemployment, pollution of the environment, corruption, and the supply of social welfare items. They believed that the difference in knowledge and literacy between the people living in townships and villages and the educated and illiterate population may cause the Chinese political and economic institutions to become unstable. Additionally, they said that the unsustainable economic expansion of China and the negative impact of gender inequality were the main causes of environmental degradation, along with the one-child policy in China. If China doesn't address these problems now, they might endanger its future development and even prevent it from achieving the goals of its grand strategy.

#### **Global Dangers**

Chinese officials believe that the biggest obstacle to achieving the objectives is the presence of outside threats. Over the years, conflict has continued to be a sore spot on our planet—two global conflicts, to be exact. Due to imperialism, China has not been spared from waging the cold war or other small-scale conflicts with the neighboring governments. China sees war as the single largest threat to its growth, while the rest of the world sees it as a potential violation of the international peaceful status. Chinese authorities are certain that their country is capable of preventing conflict or, as one expert put it, avoiding war. But if a war breaks out or a conflict starts, it would unavoidably hinder China's development efforts. China should achieve the objectives of its Grand Strategy, even if a conflict as a solution may not be possible in this day and age.

China views the United States of America and its allies as a serious danger to its grand strategy. (Glaser, (2015) For this reason, cordial ties with the US are essential, even if it's still unclear what the US wants from China. The ideological differences are the primary cause of this view. China feels that America wants to maintain its supremacy in the East Asia area, while the US intends to erode the CPC's power over China. The G7 and its leaders, especially America, want to restrain China much as they did the USSR during the Cold War. All of China's neighbors,

with the exception of Vietnam, which has a tense relationship with the country, want to be friends with China at the moment. However, they are also at odds with China's growing influence in the area and wonder what policies it will take against them once it reaches a certain level of strength. China does not want to challenge the idea of the hegemon and does not want to become involved in power politics similar to those during the Cold War.

As Chinese ambassador Dai Bingguo correctly said, China has no intention of becoming a hegemon, nor does it want to dominate other regional powers in order to gain strength or outcompete them for hegemony (Carrai, Rudolph, & Szonyi, 2022). Additionally, he said that China has no intention of adopting the dual dominance theory or the Monroe Doctrine. It suggests that China wants to warn America and its allies against encircling China, and that China opposes the inclination to adopt a Cold War mindset. In order to avoid conflict in the region, China requests the same thing from other governments in the area. When Dai said that "those powers who still have Cold War mentality and who stand against China, they arm Taiwan," he was making use of this defense. He went on to say, "We hope other nations in the area won't pursue any policies that will harm or challenge China." "Chinese people are well aware that having strained ties with any major power—especially the United States—would be very dangerous for their interests and for achieving their strategic goals in implementing their Grand Strategy. In the first place, hostility breeds violence; in the second place, should it abate, it diverts Chinese focus from modernization toward the weapons race. For instance, the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and China had no beneficial effects; instead, it sparked an arms race and hampered economic growth. Therefore, China's grand plan would be impacted if there are instability on its perimeter. Over the years, China has suffered and experienced instability as a result of any act of aggression in its neighborhood, whether it takes the form of Chinese involvement in an external war or disrupts the Chinese area. Researchers and officials have recently placed less emphasis on the conventional dangers as a focal point of the Chinese grand strategy than they have on the non-traditional challenges.

### **Hedley Bull's Institutions and China's Grand Strategy:**

Future developments in Asia Pacific are contingent upon China's nonviolent transformation. China has taken on the responsibility for the growth and prosperity of this specific area of the globe, as further shown by China's Grand Strategy. Regime transition is supposed to proceed with the regional nations' economic growth via communication to achieve advantages for all parties involved and to reinforce security at the same time. China's approach to regional politics stems from the discovery of a new regional political structure that takes into account China's cultural background. China, as Hedley Bull noted, takes a pragmatic stance toward international society, assuring regional stability in order to protect the interests of the Chinese state, rather than a realistic or political one (Manzoor, 2021). It would be oversimplified to attribute China's institutionalization and upholding of order to maxims; rather, they are products of historical developments. Bull argues that this is the case because, in contrast to domestic society, where participants share a political community, a common aim, and a political society, nations in international society seek shared interests by setting or choosing to abide by the norms established by those institutions, which essentially provides the objective of "order." Bull's idea of institutions encompasses the Balance of Power, Great Powers, International Law, Diplomacy, and War as an institution.

China has been able to exercise its dominance with balance of power, meaning that it does not impose the same amount of power on others as it does on itself.

This is primarily shown by the fact that the Balance of Power is one of the key institutions in both European and global civilization. China used this as a tactic to protect its interests and guarantee its survival. States in the European state system, for example, were required to take similar precautions to safeguard themselves against the dynamic and intricate international institutions. States operating under the European state system in this instance handled both their military and civilian matters entirely voluntarily, but they had promised one another that they would not pursue their interests in a way that would annoy their neighbors. According to Hao, China adopted the Western International system during the Qing Dynasty (Carrai, 2020).

A lot remains uncertain in light of China's Grand Strategy as a growing power in the Asia-Pacific, about whether or not China has adopted the Balance of Power as an acknowledged component of the international normative framework. According to Li Hong Zhang, during the earlier era of European international society, major countries signed treaties intended to support smaller powers (Zhang, 2001) If Korea, a little state in East Asia, had been one of those weak powers, then the treaty would have been appropriate. In the event that the surrounding nations strengthened their resolve and reached a deal to protect Korea, trade matters might be handled peacefully, leading to a profitable conclusion for everyone involved. China showed interest in implementing the balance of power institution, which would aid in safeguarding its interests while interacting with other regional players. Although China is grateful that Korea has acknowledged its security interests, it is also aware of how intertwined China's and Korea's security interests are. The fact that China has established an institutional framework for a balance of power indicates that it is also prepared to use that framework to preserve other regional states' sovereignty, uphold their standards, and maintain order through institutional cooperation. According to China's strategy, the country should seek to build relationships and strengthen the political framework that will lead to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific area. It went on to say that China should abandon the Cold War, that authors should concentrate on bringing stability to the area, and that major powers need to understand that other people have interests as well and should not act in a manner that is detrimental to them. Regarding the same point, the author comes to the conclusion that little states need to be independent of any group. China's objective is to replace the traditional politics of rivalry with a new understanding of state-to-state interaction. China views itself as pursuing a shared future vision as it carries out its Grand Strategy.

#### **Using War as a Tool to Bring About Peace:**

Like other nations, China believes that war is good and neither wicked nor harmful (Russell & Linsky, 2020) This essay will make the case that using force via war has a long history. During this time in European international society, China remained a victim and did not benefit from any conflicts. Even though war has always been destructive, according to Grotian theory, it can nevertheless serve to uphold

justice: "It's like claiming that peace is the norm and that war is its violation or infringement; or that peace comes before war and makes sense before it; or that war is necessary but should only be carried out to the greatest extent feasible. It's also possible to claim that war is necessary because it's the only means of upholding justice, particularly in situations where there is no political superior. "

As the aforementioned remark makes clear, conflict plays a crucial role in maintaining justice in the intersocietal sphere. Nonetheless, this is predicated on a nation's relative power in defending international law. Nonetheless, the Asia-Pacific area contains elements that pose a danger and offer difficulties for China's national security. Its primary strategic function is to create a security barrier for China, guaranteeing both that country's security and the stability and peace of a particular Asia-Pacific area. China has modernized its military via coexistence and military exchanges, non-alignment, non-confrontation, etc. China has also increased its military cooperation with other governments' armed forces on the basis of mutual benefit. Enhancing border region cooperation for maritime security, taking part in UN peacekeeping missions and international counterterrorism operations, and conducting tests and exercises with the cooperation of other nations in the region to maintain peace in the Asia-Pacific and prevent war are other aspects of activity. If required, China would make use of this organization to guarantee the maintenance of the previous international order.

#### **China and the Great Power System:**

Some changed their perspectives on the historical role of major powers in light of Chinese perspectives. Beijing has seen such a role in China from both sides. European powers serve as the intermediaries between other nations in the European international community. Their gains came at the price of other weaker nations like the Ottoman Empire, which is now part of Turkey. However, China has been seeing immense might as a danger to its own survival rather than as a guarantee of long-lasting peace. China expressed dissatisfaction with the conduct of European international society, arguing that their acts were immoral since they were using coercion to extract as much money as possible from China. To conclude that China is a regional power or a newly rising superpower would be premature. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize from an analysis of

China's Grand Strategy for the Asia-Pacific region that China recognizes the institutional role of great power and works to foster stability in the area by fostering collaboration with both successful and failing nations. China supports particular interests via diplomatic and military backing in addition to economic cooperation, since doing so expands and develops the area and its member nations.

**International legal rule:**

Consequently, in 1864, China acknowledged the legitimacy of international law as an institution after its diplomatic victory over the European continent (Yin, 2016) Chinese opinions about international law were impacted by this development. They started to acknowledge it as a significant institution that upholds international law and order. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, China did not recognize international law as an institution. Dong Xun argues that the meaning of this idea of a "nation" if there are so many countries outside China and if there is no law that can control them may in fact be conceivable. Overall, there were two major contributing elements. The first was China's failure to see the unfair treatment of Europeans as a danger. The academic discoveries that followed proved that China only sometimes used international law to raise its standing in the world. Second, they were unable to compete with Europe in any form, thus they decided against going to war with the European countries.

It should be noted that China's leaders previously held the view that major countries were receiving the required protection from international law, which led to a degree of skepticism about the institution. However, China has realized that for nations to coexist peacefully, they must uphold the rule of law since it rose to prominence. China believes that international laws and regulations are largely accepted by nations around the world and are compliant with the UN charter. From a Chinese perspective, international laws need to be formulated after receiving national consent before being applied regionally or globally. In order to show that they were not bound by the rules of war, China, India, and Myanmar established the concept of peaceful coexistence in international relations in 1954 (Zhi, 2018) In this sense, it has access to more than 400 treaties and almost all worldwide intergovernmental bodies. Furthermore, China has access to practically all major intergovernmental bodies and more than 400 treaties. China facilitated the adoption of an

advance code for unanticipated naval engagements at the 2014 Western Pacific Naval Symposium as a sign of its commitment to the security and stability of the Asia Pacific region. Along with ASEAN nations, China has pledged to uphold the DOC's protocol for the Parties in the South China Sea and provided a guarantee for the COC's early completion. Apart from embracing cyber and outer space security, China is becoming concerned about rules pertaining to regional integration.

**Diplomacy as a Tool for Promoting Peace:**

In defending their national interests, the diplomats in the European International Society tended to use more coercive tactics, which made them less helpful in maintaining world peace. China genuinely continued to hold the belief that state interests should be protected at all costs. That was a distinct era from the Grotius School's introduction of a new view of diplomacy, when it was used as an instrument of war rather than peace. In Wang's words, "diplomats fight with brush, fight with tongue, and fight with the mind," he said it differently. Global diplomacy has grown significantly in importance recently—so much so that it is now considered indispensable for resolving any international dispute. Although China officially engages in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, its notion of diplomacy remained restricted to conventional diplomacy until recently. China started the Six-Party Talks, the Xiangshan Forum, which fosters scholarly problem-solving while simultaneously developing connections, and the Law enforcement and Security conversation with ASEAN to guarantee that the Asia-Pacific region becomes a safer place.

**In summary:**

It is clear from the study above that Chinese behavior as a growing force in the Asia-Pacific area is best explained by English education. Chinese perspectives on regional order are pragmatic rather than either realist or idealism; they both seek to protect national interests and maintain peace in the area. China is aggressively pursuing the well-defined Grand Strategy, which calls for investments in regional development, maritime security, and military modernization in order to safeguard national interests. China is eager to prevent any military confrontation in the area from becoming worse in order to achieve these interests, as seen by previous actions. On the diplomatic front, China's efforts have

been successful in persuading the governments in the region that working with China would be in their best interests in establishing peace and stability in the area. As a component of its Grand Strategy, China's BRI aims to create economic and internal development while avoiding "problematic" regions like the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. It provides China with other options for obtaining the energy it needs. The response of other governments to a change in the balance of power, modifications to the international system, and the leadership's authority over the plans are some of the variables that might impact China's grand strategy.

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