

PAKISTAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS DURING OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (2001-2014): CARROT AND STICK APPROACH AT WORK

Muhammad Ali^{*1}, Riaz Nadeem², Shahzad Nadeem³

^{*1,2}MPhil in International Relations from Punjab University; ³MA International Relations

Corresponding Author: *

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ABSTRACT

In close temporal proximity of September 11, 2001 attacks, Pakistan-US relations were at the unprecedented lowest ebb. Consequential upshots of said attacks not only redesigned global political ambiance infusing a renewed focus on combating terrorism, particularly through "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, but also necessitated convalescence of sanctions-stricken Pakistan-US relations. Ostensibly, Pakistan's geo-strategically vital location in immediacy of landlocked Afghanistan prompted the US to recuperate its relations with Pakistan by any means necessary. Henceforth, the US put coercive diplomacy at work and aligned Pakistan with itself before launching Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and thenceforward incessantly practiced "carrot and stick" approach to ensure Pakistan's unwavering engagement and methodical support of US led Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan. This paper attempts to examine "carrot and stick" approach which eventually hybridized the relationship as well as investigates the multifariousness of divergent interests of Pakistan and the US in Afghanistan throughout the Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) through employing realist framework. It seeks to comprehend major areas of mutual cooperation e.g. incentives, concessions, financial or military aid, as well as principal irritants and frictions including trust deficit, divergent interests and insensitivity of US towards reservation of Pakistan etc.

Keywords: Pakistan; United States; Relationship; Cooperation; Frictions; Interests; War on Terror; Engagement; Estrangement.

INTRODUCTION

After emergence on the map of earth, Pakistan was in need to establish relations with great powers in search of assistance to face inherited problems, including territorial disputes, refugee rehabilitation challenges, watercourse disputes, and a fragile economy. The main challenge, however, was the security threat from India. Indian leaders believed that Pakistan might not sustain itself as an independent state and would request to be merged with India again (Chitkara 1998). Most of the problems were Indian related, however, India had flatly refused to resolve them. Hence, Pakistan had to be in alliance with powerful states. In this regard, Pakistan approached the Britain, but post WWII Britain was unable to provide any help to newly independent state (Kux, 2011). The USSR did not show much interest in Pakistan's independence and remained indifferent, while the US, despite sending

congratulatory messages to Pakistan on its independence, favored building a strategic relationship with India. However, India did not responded to offers of the US (Venkatramani, 1984). India's desire to be aligned with 'non-aligned' movement and US' desire to restrict the expansion of communism and limit the influence of the USSR coupled with the important geo-strategic location of Pakistan, which the US seen appropriate to serve her interest in the region, necessitated the establishment of Pakistan-US strategic relations (Sattar 2019). The US eventually established a strategic alliance with Pakistan in 1950s, with divergent interest between both states, and such relationship established on divergent interest could not persisted for a long period of time and it faded with the arrival of president J.F.Kennedy. U-2 incident and 1965 war injected the element of distrust between Pakistan and

the US. Hence, the first phase of high profile relationship between Pakistan and the US last its warmth (Kux 2011). The second phase of high profile relationship between Pakistan and the US began with the invasion of Afghanistan by USSR, and it also faded away with the end of Afghan war. After the end of second phase of high profile relations, Pakistan had to face the rigor and furor of its mighty partner. The US imposed several proliferation and democracy based sanctions on Pakistan. The third high profile period of Pakistan-US relations dawned after the September 11, 2001 attacks. The relations between Pakistan and the US were at the floor at the time of said attacks. The US launched global campaign against terror and Pakistan became the front line ally of the US. The 9/11 attacks prompted a new episode in Pakistan-US relations, both of the partners offered concessions and privileges to each other, however, their interest never fully converged because both the nations had less confidence in others intentions. The US kept pressuring Pakistan to support its global campaign against terrorism in exchange of economic and military aid. The US also lifted sanctions on Pakistan and resumed aid. Pakistan became a crucial player in the US-led War on Terror, leading to significant human and economic costs for Pakistan, however, the US blamed that Pakistan was exercising duplicity. Consequently, the strategic relationship between Pakistan and the US during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014) was hybridized with cooperation and frictions. The study delves to highlight mutual cooperation, incentives and concessions as well as distrust, conflicts of interest, frustrations and complex nature of the Pakistan-US relationship during this period.

Literature Review

A literature review is a crucial component of research that enables the researcher to build upon existing knowledge, identify gaps and limitations, and meaningfully contribute to the field. By extensively reviewing relevant studies, including scholarly works, diplomatic accounts, research articles, and surveys, this research finds that there is a notable gap of research that specifically focus on complex interplay of 'carrot and stick policy' coupled with 'coercive diplomacy' in relationship between Pakistan and the US during the critical period of "Operations Enduring Freedom" (2001-2014). This research aims to fill that gap by conducting an in-

depth investigation through analyzing major areas of engagements, cooperation and concessions and mutual support as well as major frictions, irritants, insensitivities and insecurities of both partners during the period, shedding light on the complexities, challenges, and opportunities that defined this period. By doing so, the researcher hopes to contribute in order to provide valuable insights for scholars, policymakers, and practitioners.

In "The Inheritance", Sanger (2009) critiques the Bush administration's strategy in the war on terror, arguing that it exposed the US to terrorist attacks and consumed vast resources without achieving meaningful results. The book highlights the challenges Obama administration inherited, including economic crises and faltering efforts in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. Sanger questioned Pakistan's commitment to the war on terror and suggested the US should pressure Pakistan to "do more". He proposes investing in Pakistan's infrastructure to foster pro-US sentiment, warning against abandoning Pakistan like the US did after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. The book laments missed opportunities and wasted resources, questioning whether the US can regain its lost influence and power.

In "How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding the Roller Coaster", Schaffer and Schaffer examine Pakistan's negotiation style with the US. As experienced diplomats, they analyse Pakistan's methods and suggest effective strategies for negotiations. They describe Pakistan-US relations as a "roller coaster" ride, marked by ups and downs. The authors identify three key factors that shape Pakistan's negotiation approach: it's perceived place in the world, particularly vis-à-vis India; Pakistani culture, which emphasizes personal relationships; and the country's government structure and political system. They highlight how these factors influence negotiations, leading to mistrust and suspension of relations at times. The book explores how Pakistan's geo-strategic location has impressed the US, leading to a complex relationship where the US needs Pakistan to achieve global goals, while Pakistan needs the US to balance India's influence. The authors discuss various periods of cooperation and estrangement, including wars with India and subsequent negotiations. They conclude that both countries can work together by recognizing potential limits and selecting goals carefully.

Markey (2013), in his book entitled "No Exit from Pakistan: America's Tortured Relationship with Islamabad" discusses "tortured" relationship between Pakistan and the US. Dr. Markey, an expert on South Asian security and governance, examines the complex and troubled relationship between Pakistan and the US. He analyses how Pakistan's internal issues, such as its growing population and nuclear capabilities, exacerbate global and US security concerns. Markey also explores Pakistan's external challenges, including its relationship with China, and how this impacts its relationship with the US. The book provides a historical overview of Pakistan-US relations from 1947 to 9/11, highlighting mutual distrust, conflicts of interest, and frustrations. Markey discusses US mistakes, anti-US sentiments in Pakistan, and the challenges posed by Pakistan's nuclear program, shedding light on the complexities of this tumultuous relationship.

Bruce Riedel (2011), in "Deadly Embrace", examines the history of Pakistan-US relations through the lens of "jihad". He explores how different Islamist leaders, including Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar, have interpreted "jihad", and how it is understood in Pakistani society. While writing from an American perspective, Riedel criticizes the US for prioritizing short-term interests in Pakistan, ignoring the growth of global jihad. He argues that US policy after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan contributed to the rise of jihadism. Riedel recounts the growth of jihadi organizations, citing the Afghan jihad as a key factor, and blames Pakistan for being "fickle and duplicitous" towards the US. He labels jihadists as terrorists and suggests ways for the US to improve relations with Pakistan. The book explores the history of Pakistan-US relations from 1947 to 2001, leading up to the 9/11 incident. As a prominent expert on US security and South Asia affairs, Riedel analyses the relationship and labels Pakistan a "disloyal ally", recommending a approach of "engagements, red lines, consistency, and constancy" to deal with Pakistan.

In "US Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power", Hook (2008) explores the contradictions of the US as the sole superpower. He examines the causes and consequences of 9/11, and how it shifted US foreign policy to a global war on terror. The US viewed the attacks as acts of war and presented a binary choice to nations: either ally with the US or support terrorism. The book discusses the US war on terror strategy and its effects. It also predicts the

future of US supremacy, stability, and military power in the 21st century, given its position as the sole superpower.

In "Making Sense of Pakistan", Farzana Sheikh (2009) examines Pakistan-US relations and their detrimental impact on Pakistani society, particularly in terms of extremism. She traces the history of the relationship, identifying India as a key factor in its establishment. Sheikh argues that the US exploited Pakistan's security concerns and rivalry with India, dragging Pakistan into wars in Afghanistan and fuelling extremism. She criticizes the relationship for lacking mutual respect and equality, characterizing it as "episodic" and circumstance-dependent, with Pakistan bearing the costs.

Theoretical Framework

After publishing an article in "The Economist", on December 11, 1948, "the carrot and stick" policy was introduced in International Relations (Nye, 2003). The carrot and stick policy refers to a stratagem which offers incentives, concessions and economic or military aid as reward and unleashes sticks as punishment including diplomatic isolations, military intervention and economic sanctions in order to achieve a perceived goal. Some of the scholars of International Relations consider the approach synonymous with "soft and hard power". Through this approach, the mightier states make weaker states to do what they want (Pallover, 2011). The approach also has its own flaws as it includes the coercive measures (James, 2012). The approach stems from realist theoretical framework. The realist theoretical framework, along with its strands, provides a comprehensive understanding of the Pakistan-US relationship. Realism in international politics has various strands, including Classical Realism, Neo-Realism, and Neo-Classical Realism. Classical Realism prioritizes state-centric approaches, assuming self-interest surpasses ethics and morality. Neo-Realism emphasizes power struggles, security contests, and the impact of international structure on state behaviour. Neo-Classical Realism combines traditional and neo-realist theories, focusing on domestic structures, elite influence, and balance of power in foreign policy decision-making. These strands help to explain complex relationships like Pakistan-US relations, where national interests, security concerns, and power dynamics play significant roles. The realist framework helps to understand the episodic and transactional nature of

Pakistan-US relations, with the US seeking to secure its national interest through its relationship with Pakistan. This framework deals with the concepts of national interest, security, power, and elite influence in foreign policy making, which are essential in understanding the dynamics of the relationship between Pakistan and the US. Defensive realism is particularly relevant to Pakistan-US relations, as both states sought to secure their national interests through their alliance - Pakistan sought to establish a relationship with a great power (the US) to address its security concerns, while the US aimed to contain the influence of the USSR and communism. Both states prioritized their national interests, with Pakistan focusing on security and the US on global aims. It can also be relevant to state how Pakistan's geo-strategic location has been significant for the US and how the US has sought to maintain its national interest through its relationship with Pakistan. Finally, it notes how Pakistan, as a smaller state, was compelled to ally with the US after 9/11, despite the unequal nature of the partnership. The aftermath of 9/11 saw the US demand cooperation from Pakistan, with Pakistan eventually joining the US-led coalition against terror. However, this alliance was between unequal partners, with Pakistan seeking to secure its sovereignty, economy, strategic assets, and address the Kashmir issue, while also balancing the threat from India. Overall, the realist theoretical framework provides a nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics at play in the Pakistan-US relationship.

Methodology and Material.

The data has been collected from both primary and secondary sources to carry-out research. Though primary and secondary data sources have been consulted, yet secondary sources predominate. Primary sources include official statistics, notifications, office orders, and documents. Secondary sources encompass a broad range of materials, including books from various fields, scholarly lectures, newspaper articles and editorials, research journals, periodicals, and internet resources. The focus is on articles published in prominent national and international papers, addressing the war on terrorism and Pakistan-US relations. Mixed method approach has been employed to give an elaborative outlook of Pakistan-US strategic relations from 1947 to 2001 (general focus) and 2001-2014 (specific focus). Data is majorly qualitative, however, factual qualitative data taken

from government departments of both government has been used.

Cooperation & Concessions

Prior to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan-US relations were at an all-time low, with sanctions imposed and military relations suspended. The US had discontinued its aid mission in Pakistan, with only minimal collaboration in food assistance and counter-narcotics support (Chamberlin, 2010). Following the 9/11 attacks, President Bush declared the attacks an "act of war" and vowed to bring the perpetrators to justice. The US coerced Pakistan into supporting its campaign against terrorism, with Deputy Defence Secretary Richard Armitage warning Pakistan to choose between fully supporting the US or facing consequences. Pakistan's President Musharraf accepted the US demands, including interrupting al-Qaeda movements, granting airspace and landing rights, sharing intelligence, and publicly denouncing the 9/11 attacks (Corera, 2006). Musharraf claimed he made the decision to protect Pakistan's sovereignty, economy, and strategic assets, while also citing a threat from Armitage to "bomb Pakistan back to the Stone Age if they didn't comply" (Musharraf, 2006). The US and Pakistan's relationship became crucial in the war on terror, with Pakistan becoming a frontline state in the US-led coalition. The "Indian factor" also played a significant role in Pakistan's decision to join the US as a frontline state in the global campaign against terrorism. Pakistan aimed to prevent an India-US alliance in Afghanistan, as India had long sought to increase its influence in the region. Pakistan perceived India's involvement in Afghanistan as a threat to its own interests, as India had a history of supporting unrest in Pakistan's Tribal Areas and Baluchistan. Following the 9/11 attacks, India quickly joined the US-led coalition against terrorism, and Pakistan feared that if it didn't join the coalition, India would gain a free hand to undermine Pakistan's interests in Afghanistan. This concern motivated Pakistan to accept the US demands and join the war on terror as a frontline state. Pakistan attempted to prevent the US attack on Afghanistan by persuading Mullah Omar to hand over Osama Bin Laden, but Omar refused, demanding proof of Osama's involvement in 9/11 and a trial. After Omar's refusal, the US launched Operation Enduring Freedom on October 7, 2001, with Pakistan's support, providing bases, airspace, and intelligence. The key objectives

of OEF were to bring the 9/11 perpetrators to justice, kill or capture Osama and other Al-Qaeda leaders, destroy Al-Qaeda, and dismantle the Taliban regime, which the US believed had close ties with Al-Qaeda (Kronstadt, 2003). Pakistan's support was crucial, and the US used coercive diplomacy to engage Pakistan as a frontline state. Pakistan accepted US demands, leading to a reversal in US foreign policy, with sanctions waived and military and economic cooperation resumed. The relationship was marked by cooperation and friction, with the US using a "carrot and stick" strategy to maintain Pakistan's support. Key areas of cooperation and friction in Pakistan-US relations during OEF 2001-2014 are discussed below during OEF.

Pakistan's cooperation with the US during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from 2001 to 2014 was crucial and encompassed several key areas:

Pakistan provided bases, logistical support, and air corridors for US operations against terrorist groups, without formal agreements or service charges (Kronstadt, 2003). Pakistan's intelligence agencies captured numerous high-profile terrorists, including Khalid al Attash and Ramzi bin al Shibh, with the US acknowledging their competence. Pakistan allowed the transportation of NATO supplies to Afghanistan through its territory (Southern Distribution Network) that carried approximately one-third of total supplies, including 80% of fuel consumption in 2007. The US had an alternative route, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), for transporting NATO supplies to Afghanistan, but it was longer and more complex than Pakistan's Southern Distribution Network (Marmon, 2010). The NDN spanned 5,169 kilometres, involved multiple modes of transportation (ships, roads, air, and rails), and passed through various countries, making it five times more expensive than the SDN. In contrast, Pakistan's SDN was a more convenient and efficient route for supplying Afghanistan, being shorter, less costly, and less complicated (Bryce, 2007).

These efforts demonstrated Pakistan's commitment as a frontline state in the war against terror, supporting the US without formal agreements or compensation.

Military Operations

Pakistan arrested Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives during Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014).

After the US invasion of Afghanistan, Taliban fighters fled and attacked coalition forces. Pakistan launched counter-terrorism operations and peace agreements in FATA from 2002, conducting 12 major operations (Al-Mizan to Zarb-e-Azb) against the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Al-Qaeda, and other terrorist groups, clearing tribal areas of terrorists (Factsheet on Pakistan's CT Effort, 2017).

Operation Al-Mizan

In 2002, President Musharraf ordered Operation Al-Mizan in Wana, South Waziristan, to target militant hideouts. The operation resulted in the arrest of key militant leaders, including Nek Muhammad, and was declared a success by Lt. Gen. Muhammad Safdar Hussain on March 26, 2003 (Khattak & Mushtaq, 2017).

Operation Zalzala

Following Nek Muhammad's death in a US drone strike, Baitullah Mehsud became the leader of militants in South Waziristan and founded the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in 2007, perpetrating suicide attacks across Pakistan. In response, Pakistan launched Operation Zalzala (Earthquake) in January 2008, successfully clearing the area of TTP militants, who fled to nearby agencies and Afghanistan.

Operation Sher Dil

In 2008, Pakistan launched Operation Sher Dil (Battle of Bajaur) against TTP militants in Bajaur Agency, killing around 1,500 militants, including Abu Saeed Almisri, and dismantling their command structure. The operation ended on February 28, 2009, with the Pakistani Army declaring victory (Yousaf, 2014).

Operation Daraghalam

The same year, Operation Daraghalam (Here I Come) was conducted in Khyber Agency to secure NATO supply routes, forcing key operatives of the Mangal Bagh militant group to flee to Afghanistan and nearby agencies.

Operation Rah-e-Haq

Operation Rah-e-Haq, also known as the first battle of Swat, was launched in October 2007 against TTP and its allied militant groups in Swat. The operation involved a series of attacks by Pakistani security forces, including the police, paramilitary troops, and

army, in different regions of Swat. The operation ended in February 2009 with a ceasefire agreement.

Operation Rah-e-Rast

Operation Rah-e-Rast, also known as the 2nd Battle of Swat, was launched in May 2009 against TTP and its allied terrorist groups in Swat, Buner, and Shangla. The operation resulted in significant losses for the militants, with approximately 2,088 killed and several key operatives of TNSM and TTP captured or killed. The operation was successful, and Pakistan regained control of Swat.

Operation Rah-e-Nijat

Operation Rah-e-Nijat was launched on June 19, 2009, in South Waziristan, targeting TTP strongholds in Laddha and Sararogha. The operation resulted in over 800 militants killed, 88 terrorists captured, destruction of TTP strongholds, and Pakistan regaining control of South Waziristan. The operation also led to significant damage to TTP and allied militant groups, and the death of TTP leader Baitullah Mehsud in a drone attack in August 2009.

Operation Zarb-e-Azab

Operation Zarb-e-Azab was launched in mid-June 2014 in North Waziristan against various militant groups, including TTP, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, al-Qaida, and the Haqqani network. The operation resulted in significant losses for the militants, with approximately 3,600 killed, including key commanders, and hundreds captured. The operation also led to the displacement of around one million people. The operation was successful in dismantling the command system of terrorist networks in Pakistan, dealing a major blow to their ability to coordinate and carry out attacks.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) from 2001 to 2014, the US cooperated with Pakistan in the following areas:

United States lifted sanctions on Pakistan

The United States lifted sanctions on Pakistan in 2001, following the country's cooperation with the US in the War on Terror. President Bush waived nuclear-related sanctions on September 22, 2001, and democracy-related sanctions on October 27, 2001, citing national security interests. This move allowed for the resumption of aid to Pakistan, marking a significant shift in US foreign policy towards the country. The sanctions had been imposed in the 1990s due to Pakistan's nuclear program and

the military coup that overthrew the democratically elected government. The lifting of sanctions paved the way for increased cooperation and assistance between the two countries (Kronstadt, 2009).

USAID Resumed its Operations in Pakistan

USAID resumed its operations in Pakistan in July 2002, after a 7-year hiatus due to nuclear-related sanctions. USAID worked to:

- Promote education and construct health facilities in remote areas.
- Reconstruct health and education facilities destroyed in the 2005 earthquake, spending \$200 million over 5 years.
- Provide microfinance loans to rural populations for small businesses and poverty eradication.
- Develop solar, wind, and renewable energy resources.
- Train over 12,000 educators to improve teaching abilities.

In response to the 2010 floods, USAID provided \$45 million in aid, including \$5.1 million to the most affected areas of Baluchistan and Sindh. By May 2012, USAID had spent \$114 million on reconstructing 61 schools and 16 healthcare facilities (USAID Pakistan fact Sheet, 2010).

Pakistan: Major Non-NATO Ally

During his visit to Pakistan in March 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell praised Pakistan's contributions to the war on terror and announced that the US would designate Pakistan as a Major Non-NATO Ally (MNNA). After completing the necessary legal formalities, Pakistan was officially granted MNNA status in June 2004. This designation enabled Pakistan to access short and long-term loans to purchase US military equipment and products, and foster closer military ties and cooperation between the two countries. The MNNA status signified a significant strengthening of US-Pakistan relations and acknowledged Pakistan's important role in the global fight against terrorism (Javaid, 2005).

US' Economic Assistance for Pakistan during OEF 2001-2014

Pakistan's cooperation in the US-led war on terror during Operation Enduring Freedom led to significant economic benefits for the country.

Despite not requesting aid, Pakistan received \$30.2 billion from the US between 2002 and 2013, with an average annual assistance of \$2.3 billion. The aid package announced in November 2001 worth over \$1 billion, and the rescheduling of debt worth \$379 million, helped ease Pakistan's economic burden. The lifting of economic sanctions also opened up international markets, including the US, EU, Japan, and others, to Pakistan. As a result, Pakistan's foreign exchange reserves increased more than tenfold, and exporters received incentives. The economic aid from the US brought stability to Pakistan's economy, and the Paris Club rescheduled loans worth \$12.5 billion. This cooperation marked a new phase in US-Pakistan relations, with economic aid playing a significant role in stabilizing Pakistan's economy.

Economic Support Fund

The US provided \$7.811 billion to Pakistan through the Economic Support Fund (ESF) from 2002 to 2004, making it the second-largest funding amount after the Coalition Support Fund (CSF). This funding was aimed at advancing US political and strategic interests in the region and was provided through grants and cooperative agreements. The ESF funding played a significant role in supporting Pakistan's economy during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

Development Assistance

According to Kronstadt's report, the US focus in Pakistan was primarily on military aid for counterterrorism operations, rather than developmental assistance. As a result, developmental aid totaled only \$286 million from 2002 to 2010, aimed at promoting education in backward areas, teacher training, English language teaching, and female education (Kronstadt, 2011). However, in 2014, the US provided an additional \$586 million for education promotion in Pakistan, as reported by the Express Tribune on June 8, 2017 (Shahbaz Rana, Tribune, 6th September 2017). This suggests a shift in focus towards education and development in later years.

CSH, Food Aid, and Human Rights & Democracy Fund

Pakistan also received significant funding from the United States in various areas during the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) period from 2001 to 2014. In addition to military aid, Pakistan received:

- \$620 million in Food Aid.
- \$249 million in Child Survival and Health (CSH) funds (although this funding was discontinued after 2011).
- \$18 million in Human Rights and Democracy Funds.

These funds were aimed at addressing humanitarian and development needs in Pakistan, and demonstrate the breadth of US assistance to the country beyond military aid (Kronstadt, 2015).

Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA) Fund

The conflict and counterinsurgency operations in Pakistan led to a significant displacement of people, with 3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in 2009. According to a UN report, Pakistan was hosting 1.2 million IDPs and 1.6 million international refugees in 2014. To address this humanitarian crisis, the United States provided \$257 million in assistance to Pakistan during the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) period from 2001 to 2014, as reported by Kronstadt in 2015. This funding aimed to support Pakistan's efforts in providing aid and services to the displaced populations (Kronstadt, 2015).

International Disaster Assistance

A devastating earthquake struck Azad Kashmir and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa on October 8, 2005, resulting in widespread destruction and a significant loss of life. According to reports, approximately 86,000 people lost their lives, and infrastructure was severely damaged in the affected areas. In response, the United States provided significant aid to Pakistan through the International Disaster Assistance (IDA) program, totaling \$724 million during the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) period from 2001 to 2014. Specifically, the US provided \$70 million in IDA funding for fiscal year 2006, and \$50 million each for fiscal years 2007 and 2008, to support reconstruction efforts in the affected regions (Kronstadt, 2015).

Coalition Support Fund for Reimbursement

The Coalition Support Fund (CSF) was a Pentagon funding program that reimbursed Pakistan for its counter-terrorism efforts and expenses incurred while supporting coalition forces, including the use of Pakistani air bases by the US. From 2002 to 2008, approximately 75% of the total aid provided to Pakistan was allocated towards counter-terrorism operations and other military purposes. During the

Operation Enduring Freedom period (2001-2014), the majority of US military assistance to Pakistan was provided under the CSF program. According to reports, the US provided \$8.138 billion to Pakistan under CSF from 2002 to 2010, and a total of approximately \$12.986 billion from 2001 to 2014.

United States: The Biggest Destination of Pakistan's Exports

During the Operation Enduring Freedom period (2001-2014), the United States was the largest destination for Pakistan's exports. The value of Pakistan's exports to the US significantly increased from \$2.2495 billion in 2001 to \$3.6756 billion in 2014, according to the US Bureau of Statistics (2022). This growth in exports was encouraged by the US, which also promoted private sector investment in Pakistan. The increased trade between the two countries reflects the strong economic ties between Pakistan and the US during this period (Beauro of Stats. 2022).

Assistance under Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act

The Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 was a bill tabled by Senator John Kerry, Richard Lugar, and Howard Berman, which aimed to triple civilian assistance to Pakistan to \$1.5 billion annually for five years (2010-2014), totalling \$7.5 billion. The bill was passed by the Senate on September 24, 2009, the House of Representatives on September 30, 2009, and signed into law by President Obama on October 15, 2009. However, the bill was criticized in Pakistan for its language and terms, which were seen as pursuing US interests in the region. The bill made aid conditional on Pakistan's cooperation in non-proliferation efforts and the war on terrorism, requiring the US Secretary of State to certify Pakistan's compliance. This shifted the focus of US aid policy towards Pakistan, linking assistance to specific security and strategic goals.

US Military and Security Related Assistance for Pakistan

I. Military Training

The United States provided training to Pakistani security personnel through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, worth \$37 million.

This program allowed Pakistani military officers to receive training in the United States, enhancing their capabilities and fostering military-to-military relations.

The training included courses on counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance (Kronstadt, 2015).

II. Arms Sales and FMF Program

- Pakistan was granted access to the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program, which enabled the purchase of US-made weapons and defence articles.

Agreements totalling \$5.4 billion were made with Pakistan, with over \$3.11 billion disbursed.

Sales included advanced weapons systems, such as:

- F-16 fighter jets
- P-3C Maritime Patrol Aircraft
- Sidewinder missiles

These sales aimed to enhance Pakistan's military capabilities and support its counterinsurgency efforts.

III. Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF)

The United States provided \$2.35 billion to support Pakistan's counterinsurgency operations against militants.

- The largest amount provided in a single year was \$800 million in 2011.

- However, this funding was discontinued after 2012 due to concerns over Pakistan's commitment to combating terrorism.

- The PCF aimed to support Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorist organizations, such as the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

IV. Non-proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related fund (NADR)

The United States provided \$157 million to Pakistan through the NADR fund. This funding supported Pakistan's efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, combat terrorism, and remove landmines. The NADR fund also supported Pakistan's efforts to improve its border security and counter smuggling.

V. International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

The United States provided \$831 million to Pakistan through the INCLE program. This funding aimed to support Pakistan's efforts to combat drug trafficking and organized crime. The INCLE program also supported Pakistan's efforts to improve its law

enforcement capabilities and strengthen its judicial system.

VI. Counter Narcotics (Pentagon Funding)

The United States provided \$272 million to Pakistan through Counter Narcotics (Pentagon Funding). This funding supported Pakistan's efforts to combat drug trafficking and terrorist organizations involved in the drug trade. The funding also supported Pakistan's efforts to improve its counter-narcotics capabilities and strengthen its cooperation with the United States on counter-narcotics issues.

Establishment of Forums to Promote Bilateral Relations

Pakistan and the United States engaged in various dialogue forums to strengthen bilateral ties, including business and strategic dialogue forums. These forums facilitated economic and bilateral relations between the two nations.

The United States-Pakistan Business Council (USPBC) was established in September 2002 to promote commercial engagements between Pakistan and the United States. The USPBC maintained contacts with government officials and non-government business persons to promote US companies' investment opportunities in Pakistan. As a subsidiary of the US Chamber of Commerce, it played a crucial role in foreign direct investment in Pakistan.

The Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) was signed on June 25, 2003, in Washington, aiming to enhance trade-related cooperation between the US and Pakistan. TIFA provided a strategic framework for dialogue and established principles for promoting friendship and cooperation in trade and economic relations. The agreement led to the establishment of the United States-Pakistan Council on Trade and Investment, which met annually to identify areas of mutual interest and promote cooperation.

The Pakistan-United States Strategic Dialogue was initiated in 2006 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the US State Department. This dialogue aimed to strengthen Pakistan-US relations, resolve trust issues, and diversify the dimensions of bilateral relations. The strategic dialogue played a vital role in addressing various issues and improving relations between the two nations.

During Operation Enduring Freedom (2001-2014), following irritants and frictions plagued the Pakistan-US relations:

The relationship between Pakistan and the US during the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) period from 2001 to 2014 was strained due to various events, including the US' coercive diplomacy to secure Pakistan's cooperation, drone attacks, the Raymond Davis case, the unilateral killing of Osama bin Laden, and unprovoked attacks on Pakistani posts by US-led ISAF/NATO forces. These incidents led to a trust deficit and mistrust, which plagued the relationship throughout the OEF period. Following are examined the calamitous implications of Pakistan's engagements in the war against terror, the frictions and divergences in the relationship, and the key events and decisions that contributed to the trust deficit and mistrust between Pakistan and the US during the OEF period.

Trust Deficit

The Pakistan-US relationship has been marked by distrust since the 1965 war, and this legacy of mistrust continued during the period under research. Before the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, Pakistani President Musharraf was sceptical of US intentions regarding Pakistan's strategic arsenal. As a precaution, he ordered the relocation and redeployment of nuclear weapons to six secret locations within Pakistan.

This mistrust was rooted in past experiences, including the US' perceived opportunistic behaviour and transactional approach to Pakistan-US relations. The US had failed to support Pakistan in its wars with India in 1965 and 1971, leading to a perception of US unreliability.

During OEF, several incidents reinforced this mistrust, including:

1. The unilateral US operation that killed Osama bin Laden, known as "Operation Spear Neptune" (NBC News, May 2, 2011).
2. The Raymond Davis case, which highlighted US disregard for Pakistani sovereignty.
3. The US' "do more" policy, which pressured Pakistan to take further action against militants.
4. Aid cuts, which demonstrated US conditional support.
5. Unprovoked attacks by US-led coalition forces on Pakistani forces along the Pak-Afghan border.

These incidents perpetuated the legacy of mistrust in Pakistan-US relations, reinforcing Pakistan's scepticism of US intentions and commitments.

Anti-Pakistan Interim Setup in Afghanistan

The Operation Enduring Freedom, launched on October 7, 2001, in Afghanistan, had significant implications for Pakistan. The US-backed Northern Alliance, comprising anti-Pakistan elements, gained control over large areas and key cities, including Kabul, under the interim presidency of Hamid Karzai. This development was a strategic setback for Pakistan, which had reservations about the Northern Alliance's anti-Pakistan stance.

Despite Pakistan's concerns, the US failed to fulfill its promises to address Islamabad's concerns regarding the new administration in Kabul. Instead, the US supported India's influence in Afghanistan, allowing New Delhi to establish consulates and sponsor militant activities in FATA and Baluchistan, further destabilizing Pakistan.

Pakistan believed that India was involved in terrorist activities and instigating insurgency in Baluchistan through its consulates in Afghanistan. The US, however, remained insensitive to Pakistan's reservations, effectively handing over the keys of Kabul to India's proxies. This development strained Pakistan-US relations, with Pakistan feeling betrayed by the US' failure to address its concerns.

The installation of a pro-Indian interim setup in Afghanistan marked a significant shift in the regional dynamics, with India gaining a strategic foothold in the country. Pakistan's concerns about India's activities in Afghanistan were ignored by the US, leading to a deterioration in Pakistan-US relations and a sense of mistrust that continues to this day.

Indo-US Nexus

After 9/11, India swiftly condemned the attacks and joined the US-led global campaign against terrorism, seeking to link the Kashmir issue with Afghanistan and terrorism. The US responded by strengthening its bilateral relationship with India during Operation Enduring Freedom, providing India with a larger role in Afghanistan. The US-India strategic partnership has grown significantly, with cooperation in areas like civil nuclear technology, defence relations, missile technology, counter-terrorism, space research, and defence productions. India has been offered advanced fighter jets and encouraged to play a vital role in Afghanistan.

Non-Proliferation, Nuclear Weapon's Security, and Dr. A. Q Khan

The issue of non-proliferation remained a contentious aspect of Pakistan-US relations. In 2003, Dr. A.Q. Khan, a prominent scientist and advisor to President Musharraf, was dismissed and placed under house arrest on charges of operating a proliferation network that provided nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Despite lacking substantial evidence, the US maintained pressure on Pakistan to address proliferation concerns. In 2007, the US Congress passed the "9/11 Commission Recommendations Act," which linked Pakistan's aid to effective non-proliferation efforts. Pakistan protested, but the US did not modify the bill. The issue persisted, with US officials expressing concerns about Pakistan's nuclear security despite CIA reports indicating effective mechanisms and efficient security. The irony lies in the US' contradictory approach, pressing Pakistan for non-proliferation while signing a civil nuclear deal with India in 2008. This double standard fuelled anti-US sentiments in Pakistan, straining the relationship further. The non-proliferation issue remained a point of contention in Pakistan-US Strategic Dialogues in 2010 and 2014, with the US continuing to apply pressure on Pakistan despite assurances of robust nuclear security.

Drone Attacks

The use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) or drones by the US in Pakistan's tribal areas has been a controversial aspect of the Pakistan-US relationship. The first drone attack in Pakistan occurred on June 18, 2004, during the Bush administration, killing seven people, including three militants and two civilians (The News, 2011). The attack also killed Nek Mohammed, a militant commander accused of harboring Al-Qaeda militants. Between 2004 and 2007, nine drone attacks were conducted, resulting in 179 casualties, including 60 militants. However, 2006 saw the highest number of civilian killings, with 93 civilians killed in two drone strikes, while only one militant was killed. The use of drones increased significantly during the Obama administration, with a total of 391 attacks conducted during Operation Enduring Freedom, resulting in the deaths of 560 innocent citizens. The most notable incident was the drone strike on a Tribal Jirga in North Waziristan Agency in 2011, which killed 38

innocent people, just a day after the release of Raymond Davis. The drone attacks have been a source of tension between Pakistan and the US, with Pakistan objecting to the strikes as a violation of its sovereignty and the US justifying them as necessary to target terrorist groups. The issue has remained a point of contention in the relationship, with the US continuing to conduct drone strikes in Pakistan's tribal areas. Table: Year Wise Drone Attacks and Fatalities in Pakistan (Rahimullah Yousafzai, BBC News 18 June 2004. Retrieved on 24 May 2022).

Pakistan strongly condemned the US drone strikes, with the government, military, and civil society protesting the violations of sovereignty and international law. The public sentiment turned increasingly anti-US, with demonstrations and blockades of NATO supply routes. Pakistan's leadership requested drone technology to conduct their own strikes, and Nawaz Sharif urged the UN General Assembly to end the strikes in 2013. Surveys showed a majority of Pakistanis opposed the drone strikes.

Amnesty International and the UN Special Rapporteur, Ben Emerson, deemed the drone strikes unlawful and a violation of human rights and sovereignty. The US justified the strikes as self-defence and necessary to target terrorists, with officials like Herold Koh, Hillary Clinton, and Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman supporting the program. However, the US failed to address Pakistani concerns and international criticism, straining relations and fuelling anti-US sentiment (Houston Chronicles, 2013).

Frequent Attacks from US-Led ISAF/NATO Forces on Pakistan

The US-led coalition forces carried out multiple unprovoked attacks on Pakistani military forces along the Pak-Afghan border, resulting in significant casualties. According to ISPR, four incidents occurred between June 2008 and July 2011:

1. June 10, 2008: Aerial attack on Goraprai post in Muhammad Agency, FATA, martyring 11 Pakistani troops and injuring 7.
2. September 30, 2010: Attack on Kharlachi Post in Kurram Agency, FATA, martyring 3 soldiers and injuring 3.
3. June 17, 2011: Attack on Ziarat Post near Salala Posts in Mohammad Agency, FATA.
4. July 19, 2011: Unprovoked firing in Angoor Adda Sector of South Waziristan Agency, martyring 4

Pakistani troops despite high-level contacts between Pakistan military officials and ISAF (ISPR Dossier, 23 January 2012)..

These incidents demonstrate a pattern of disregard for Pakistani sovereignty and military forces by the US-led coalition, causing significant tension and strain in the relationship.

Raymond Davis Case: US Duplicity Unfolded

The Raymond Davis case in 2011 was a major crisis in Pakistan-US relations, testing their alliance in the war on terror. Davis, a CIA contractor and former US soldier, killed two men in Lahore, sparking a diplomatic row. The US demanded his release, citing diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention, while Pakistan insisted on prosecuting him for murder. The case revealed Davis's involvement in anti-state activities, spying, and connections with militant groups, straining ties between the two nations. A compromise was reached, and Davis was released after payment of blood money to the victims' families, but the episode fuelled anti-US sentiment in Pakistan and heightened mistrust between the two countries, exemplifying "realpolitik in action" (Jetly, 2011).

Operation Neptune Spear: US' Unilateral Approach

The killing of Osama Bin Laden (OBL) on May 2, 2011, in a unilateral US operation in Abbottabad, Pakistan, severely damaged Pakistan-US relations. Despite Pakistan's significant contributions to the war on terror, the US operation and subsequent statements by US officials, including John Brennan and Leon Panetta, questioned Pakistan's commitment to counterterrorism and alleged that Pakistan had harbored OBL. Pakistan vehemently denied these allegations, with President Asif Ali Zardari highlighting Pakistan's sacrifices in the war on terror (Mofa press release, 3 May 2011). The operation and subsequent statements fueled anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, with many viewing the US as an untrustworthy ally (Calabresi, 2011). The Pakistani government and parliament condemned the raid, resolved to uphold Pakistan's sovereignty, and suggested reviewing the relationship with the US. The incident further strained relations, which were already at a low point, and undermined trust between the two nations (Chomsky, 2011).

Shakeel Afridi Case

Dr. Shakil Afridi, a Pakistani doctor, collaborated with the US intelligence agency to collect DNA samples of Osama Bin Laden, leading to the execution of "Operation Spear Neptune". He was captured in 2011 and sentenced to 33 years in prison for spying against the state, later reduced to 23 years. The US responded by withholding aid to Pakistan, cutting \$33 million from Foreign Military Financing, and introducing a bill to halt aid until Afridi's release. This case severely strained Pakistan-US relations, with Pakistan viewing Afridi as a traitor and the US seeing him as a hero (The New York Times, 2012). The incident symbolized the mistrust and conflicting interests between the two nations, further damaging their already fragile relationship.

Salala Check Posts Attacks

The NATO attack on Pakistani military posts in Salala, Mohammed Agency, on November 25-26, 2011, resulted in the martyrdom of 28 Pakistani security personnel and injured 12 others. This incident was the most severe in a series of similar attacks between 2008 and 2011, and it significantly deteriorated the already strained Pakistan-US relations.

The context of the attack reveals that Pakistan's armed forces had cleared the Mohammad Agency region after a nine-month operation and established posts, including Boulder and Volcano, to prevent militant infiltration from Afghanistan. The attacked posts were located inside Pakistan, 300-400 meters from the Pak-Afghan border, and 1.5 kilometers apart from each other.

The attack on Salala Posts was a grave incident that heightened tensions between Pakistan and the US, leading to a significant downturn in their relations. The incident raised questions about the intentions and actions of NATO forces and the US, and Pakistan's role in the war on terror. The attack also sparked widespread outrage and anti-US sentiment in Pakistan, further straining the relationship between the two countries (Nasr, 2013).

Pakistan's response to the Salala Posts attacks was swift and strong. The government and military leadership condemned the attack, and a joint session of Parliament was called to denounce the violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. The public was outraged, and criticism of US policies erupted in society. Pakistan took several measures, including:

1. Stopping NATO supply routes through Pakistan, which were the quickest and most efficient routes into Afghanistan.
2. Demanding an official apology from the US before reopening the supply routes (Al-Jazeera, 2012).
3. Evacuating the Shamsi airfield, which had been in US possession since 2001 and was suspected of being used for drone operations (The Guardian, 2011).

The US eventually apologized in July 2012, and the NATO supply routes were reopened. The evacuation of Shamsi airfield ended speculation about its use for drone operations. Pakistan's strong response to the Salala Posts attacks demonstrated its determination to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity (Al-Jazeera, 2012)

The US Demands and Do More Policy

Pakistan's efforts in the war on terror were consistently met with demands from the US to "do more", despite Pakistan's significant sacrifices, including the loss of over 26,000 military personnel and 48,500 civilians, and economic losses of over \$102 billion. The "do more" mantra was seen as a sign of US frustration and ingratitude, and was deeply resented by Pakistan's military and political leadership. The policy was also perceived as a form of "thanklessness" and fueled anti-US sentiment in Pakistan.

The US pressure on Pakistan to "do more" was not limited to counter-terrorism efforts, but also extended to issues like the Kashmir dispute, where the US pushed Pakistan to take steps to appease India. This approach was seen as a form of coercion, using aid cuts and economic pressure to compel Pakistan to comply with US demands.

The "do more" policy was a major irritant in Pakistan-US relations during the OEF period, and symbolized the asymmetry and distrust in the relationship. Pakistan felt that its efforts were not being recognized or appreciated, and that the US was constantly shifting the goalposts. The legacy of this policy continues to shape Pakistan's perceptions of the US and its role in the region.

Conclusion

The research highlights the complexities and contradictions in Pakistan-US strategic relations during the OEF period (2001-2014). The relationship was marked by engagements, cooperation, and irritants, with the US using a "carrot and stick" strategy to ensure Pakistan's support in the war on

terror. Despite being a Major non-NATO ally, Pakistan couldn't fully benefit from the designation. The interests of both states couldn't converge, and the relationship remained fragile due to trust deficit and perceived unreliability. The year 2011 was particularly perilous, with incidents like Raymond Davis, Operation Neptune Spear, and Salala Posts attacks. The US remained insensitive to Pakistan's concerns, and anti-US sentiments in Pakistan were at an all-time high. Pakistan's decision to join the war on terror proved fatal, with heavy losses in human lives and finances, while US cooperation was insufficient. The relationship lacked the essential element of respect, making it challenging and troubled.

Recommendations

This research concludes with recommendations for policy makers in Pakistan and the US, as well as researchers, to improve the Pakistan-US relationship and conduct future research.

I) For Pakistani policy makers:

- Review and redesign foreign policy to balance relations with all nations, prioritizing national interest and gaining international support on Kashmir issue.
- Recognize the US' capricious nature and India-centric approach in the region.

(I) For US policy makers:

- Formulate a relationship based on mutual trust and respect, addressing Pakistan's concerns and resolving the Kashmir issue.
- Recognize the anti-US sentiments in Pakistan and take steps to address them.

(II) For researchers:

- Focus on the "Operation Freedom's Sentinel 2015-2021" period to complete the study of Pakistan-US relations during the war in Afghanistan.
- Utilize declassified documents to conduct more comprehensive research in the future.

These recommendations aim to promote a more balanced and respectful relationship between Pakistan and the US, and to encourage further research to deepen understanding of this complex relationship.

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